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THE SPIRIT AND TASK OF DEMOCRATIC 
COSMOPOLITANISM: 
EUROPEAN POLITICAL IDENTITY 
AT THE LIMITS OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 
Paul P Linden-Retek* 
Summary: Motivating this article is the continuing, yet diffi cult hope 
for a Europe of democratic cosmopolitanism, for a Europe in which 
cosmopolitics works to continually question the terms of lingering ex-
clusion while preserving the ideals of self-legislation and democratic 
authorship. In what follows, I expand the familiar criticism of Europe’s 
democratic legitimacy gap, its democratic deficit, as a lens through 
which to analyse the possibility of a supranational participatory iden-
tity within the European political space. First, I describe the contem-
porary juridification of European politics, specifically concerning the 
formal legalism of the European Court of Justice, and the dangers 
such depoliticisation poses to the search for a cosmopolitan demos, 
depriving it of its solidaristic base and affective core. Second, I offer 
a critique of Jürgen Habermas’s ‘constitutional patriotism’ as a vi-
able frame in which Europeans might hope to dissolve the contradic-
tions of a nascent constitutional democracy at the supranational level. 
Rather, following the work of Bonnie Honig, I develop a more primary 
and original paradox confronting the European Union: the ‘paradox of 
politics’, which posits the radical indeterminacy of the demos as the 
starting place for the creation of any political identity. Third, draw-
ing on Ernesto Laclau’s conception of hegemony, I develop in greater 
detail the processes of symbolic identity-formation involved in such 
a creation, namely the interplay of inclusion/exclusion that charac-
terises modern political attachment. What this analysis elucidates is 
that the problem of EU constitutionalisation and political integration 
is the problem of borders or of the closed polis, in general. The ap-
posite symbolic frame of European political identity is therefore that 
of ‘the heterogeneous’, that which constructs yet destabilises our set-
tled understanding of boundary and border and reveals them to be 
contingent. In this vein, I argue that the operative European political 
subjects are now in a certain sense the refugees, the sans-papiers, 
and the third-country nationals, each of whom serves to remind EU 
citizens of this foundational contingency of existing legal orders. Prac-
tically, I analyse European citizenship and immigration laws within 
* PhD student, Department of Political Science, Yale University; Harvard University, AB 
2008; Yale Law School, JD 2012. 
  
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
  
176 Paul P Linden-Retek: The Spirit and Task of Democratic Cosmopolitanism 
their broader institutional and policy contexts: asylum and refugee 
policy, Frontex and the EU’s border security policy, and the promise 
and dangers of various models of disaggregated citizenship operating 
within the European legal space. I conclude with a preliminary discus-
sion of the political task that we might appropriately call European 
cosmopolitics: the reinvention of emancipatory and utopian possibility 
into the future, beyond the nation-state to the droit de cité, the asser-
tion of unconditional citizenship. Here, the European city - as a site 
in which the droit de cité can be anticipated and achieved - is where 
new supranational sovereignties might be born. 
1. Introduction 
In March 1994, Václav Havel addressed the European Parliament
and proposed the drafting of ‘A Charter of European Identity’, which 
‘would clearly define the ideas on which it [the European Union] is found-
ed, its meanings and the values it intends to embody’.1 Havel spoke open-
ly about the need to reconcile the hyper-rationalised, legalistic ‘machin-
ery’ of EU integration with the cultural, symbolic, and spiritual dimen-
sions of that same undertaking. Havel noted that European institutions
might be quite efficiently integrated but that this alone can hardly serve 
as inspiration for a new European demos. ‘It [the Maastricht Treaty] ad-
dressed’, Havel said, ‘my reason, but not my heart’.2 The current juridi-
fied form of integration is devoid of deeper emotional resonance, of a  
sense of belonging in common, of togetherness. If the European project 
is to be successful, according to Havel’s reading, Europeans will need to 
appreciate Europe as a fulfilment of democratic community, of a social
solidarity that is expressed through inclusion and participation in civic 
life. It is a solidarity that relies not only upon reciprocal rights-claims 
under transnational human rights law but also upon an orientation to 
a shared world of meaning-creation, in which the ideals of democracy 
disclose themselves in everyday practice. Europe and its political iden-
tity rely, in short, on the democratisation of the struggles of those who 
remain on the margins. 
Motivating this article is thus the continuing, yet difficult, hope for a 
Europe of democratic cosmopolitanism, for a Europe in which cosmopoli-
tics works to continually question the very terms of lingering exclusion. 
In part, this is a problem of the nation-state itself. Contemporary na-
1  Václav Havel, Speech in the European Parliament, Strasbourg, 8 March 1994 <http:// 
www.vaclavhavel.cz/index.php?sec=3&id=1&kat=1&from=115#> accessed 10 June 2012. 
2 ibid. 
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tions largely have lost the capacity to retain sovereignty over matters of
national importance, be they nuclear proliferation, climate change, mass
migration, multiculturalism, or the pace and cruelties of global capi-
talism. It is at once a problem of necessity, the structural demands on
governance in a globalised world, and of contingency, the moral-political 
interchangeability of citizens from one nation to the next. Once states 
‘pool’ their sovereignties into transnational legal orders to regulate and 
tame cross-national concerns, national democratic identities are placed
under considerable strain.3 The symbolic relationship of the democratic
citizen to the rules and values that order her life, perhaps even give
meaning to it as a free endeavour, is increasingly confused. Moreover, if
we continue to believe in an ideal of self-legislation and democratic au-
thorship, the ever more complex array of transnational legal instruments 
and distant bureaucracies should give us pause. We might, for example,
question whether such arrangements can respond to the civic expecta-
tions of free peoples. We might wonder where the European project will
take us if it continues to skip hastily over the absent European demos.4 
And, yet, the matter is not as plain as reasserting ‘the people’ on a
European scale. Or, rather, it must not be if Europe’s anticipation of dem-
ocratic cosmopolitanism is to be preserved. That is, if Europe is to avoid 
repeating and recreating the attendant exclusions of national chauvin-
ism merely on a grander stage, Europe must not become a new, powerful
super-state, its boundaries redrawn and reinforced, leaving those who 
were marginalised at the national level still-marginalised at the supra-
national level. The critical task is therefore to democratise the European
transnational legal edifice, a framework which has already been erected 
in our name, if not wholly by our will. Only through such a political act 
can a new European identity assert itself freely. This act - if it is to be
3  See generally Jürgen Habermas, ‘The European Nation-State: On the Past and Future of 
Sovereignty and Citizenship’ (1998) 10(2) Public Culture 397. 
4  Habermas himself, in paraphrasing a question first posed by Walter Benjamin, asks the 
following: ‘Is it possible that one day an emancipated human race could encounter itself 
within an expanded space of discursive will formation and yet be robbed of the light in 
which it is capable of interpreting its life as something good? . . . Without the influx of those 
semantic energies with which Benjamin’s rescuing critique was concerned, the structures 
of practical discourse—finally well established—would necessarily become desolate’. Jür-
gen Habermas, ‘Consciousness-Raising or Rescuing Critique?’ in Gary Smith (ed), On Wal-
ter Benjamin: Critical Essays and Recollections (MIT Press 1988) 123 [emphasis added]. 
In applying this insight to the supranational political context and in particular to the well-
developed supranational structures of the European Union, we can identify an analogous 
fear inscribed within the future realisation of a cosmopolitan order. It is not necessarily that 
European society will be unable to see its accomplishment as something good; it is rather 
that just at the moment when Europe succeeds in integrating itself, the very semantic and 
utopian energies that had previously driven and given meaning to that integration will have 
slipped away. Precisely when Europe has proclaimed its unification, it will have concealed 
or perhaps even lost the very idea of itself. 
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intelligible as cosmopolitan and as European - must directly question the
accepted practices of inclusion and exclusion that have hitherto marked
the national experience. The formation of a new European political iden-
tity is not, therefore, a matter of transnational legal process. It obtains in
neither an act of law nor a pronouncement of elites. Rather, a European
demos is to be found in the concrete political struggles that bestride and
betray the borders as they have been drawn, in the struggles that ques-
tion the logic of the border’s continuing existence.
In what follows, I would like to expand the familiar criticism of Eu-
rope’s democratic legitimacy gap, its democratic deficit. I intend to use 
this critique as a lens through which to analyse the possibility of a su-
pranational participatory identity within the European political and cul-
tural space. It is my hope to begin to make sense of what we might mean
when we speak of a shared European identity and in what particular
political struggles this identity might inhere. What is the relationship
between particularity and universality, between the part and the whole,
in an expanding political community of diverse Others? How does this 
relate to the project of political integration and enlargement to which Eu-
rope is currently committed? How is the interrogation of political identity
to proceed, with which vocabularies, and on what terms? In all, I wish to
explore the importance of the symbolic form for the process of cultural
contestation, for the negotiations of deeply seated identities, and for the 
relevance of the European project into the future. 
First, I describe the contemporary juridification of European poli-
tics and the dangers it poses to the project of democratic cosmopolitan-
ism. I argue that the formal legalism through which the European Court 
of Justice has established a European ‘constitutional’ order has failed to 
foster an attendant supranational civic identity among Europe’s citizens. 
Europe’s contemporary crisis of democratisation, in which executive-ju-
dicial organs steer and administer political integration, leaves European
solidarity stillborn. While transnational law has admirably reduced reli-
ance on ethnic identities, it nevertheless cannot ground a new European
demos, as such. In short, it cannot replace altogether a participatory 
European democratic politics.
Second, I offer a critique of Jürgen Habermas’s constitutional pa-
triotism as a viable frame in which Europeans might navigate the com-
peting demands of particularism and universalism. The concept of con-
stitutional patriotism fails to account for political affect and instead im-
plicitly assumes an orientation on the part of citizens to determine their 
communal lives according to liberal-democratic principles. In seeking
to dissolve the paradox of constitutional democracy, Habermas deprives
cosmopolitan practice of its participatory solidarity and its motivational
core. I thus argue that the expression of European political identity in
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constitutional patriotic terms is a false start, an insuffi cient conceptual
prism through which to analyse political identity-formation. If the Euro-
pean Union is to regain the semantic and conceptual resources required
to forge a coherent political identity, it must look elsewhere. Rather, fol-
lowing Bonnie Honig, I distinguish a more primary and original paradox 
confronting the European Union: the paradox of politics, which posits
the radical indeterminacy of the demos as the starting place for the cre-
ation of identity. ‘The people’ is a body always in need of self-recreation 
through politics deprived of any ultimate reliance on the principles of
law. The response of European cosmopolitan identity should be precisely
to occupy this space of indeterminacy, to see itself as an incomplete po-
litical subject always disruptive of received limits and boundaries. 
Third, I develop in greater detail the processes of symbolic identity-
formation, namely the interplay of inclusion/exclusion that characterises
modern political attachment. At the heart of political identity, there is a 
profound split. Drawing on Ernesto Laclau’s work on hegemony, I argue 
that the logic of identity is both disrupted by and constituted through 
the existence of an Other beyond a drawn (national) boundary. What this 
analysis will elucidate is that the problem of EU constitutionalisation
and political integration is the problem of borders or of the closed polis, 
in general. In this sense, EU citizenship, migration and asylum policies, 
insofar as they confront the question of boundaries directly, are central 
to understanding the future of any shared European cosmopolitan iden-
tity. The appropriate symbolic frame of European political identity is that
of the heterogeneous itself. 
Next, I argue that the operative European political subjects are now 
in a certain sense the refugees, the sans-papiers, the third-country na-
tionals, and the citizens of other (recently admitted or accession) Euro-
pean states, each of whom serves to remind EU nationals of the founda-
tional contingency of their particular, existing legal orders. Practically, I 
analyse European citizenship and immigration laws within their broader 
institutional and policy contexts: asylum and refugee policy, Frontex and 
the EU’s border security policy, and the promise and dangers of various 
models of disaggregated citizenship operating within the European legal 
space. In other words, I take the process of European integration and en-
largement to be one of continually coming to terms with the limits, insta-
bility, and iterability of both law and identity. The figure of the refugee,
perpetually held in between, presents a productive Arendtian ‘exemplary
validity’ against which European citizens can question and re-evaluate 
their always-contingent political attachments.
Finally, I conclude with a preliminary discussion of the political task 
that we might appropriately call European cosmopolitics. The European
project inheres not only in formalised integration according to public law
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but also in the processes of democratisation that seek alternative insti-
tutional arrangements, that seek to refresh unremittingly the political 
landscape. In part, this task is grounded in a project of enlargement sen-
sitive to the encounter with the non-integrated Other, a project that re-
invents emancipatory and utopian possibility into the future, beyond the 
nation-state to the droit de cité, the assertion of unconditional citizen-
ship. Here, the European city - as a site in which the droit de cité might
be anticipated and achieved - is where new supranational sovereignties 
might be born. It is within this space that solidarity, constitutionalism, 
and radical democracy are negotiated in an uneasy and ever-shifting 
discursive-political encounter, an encounter that can properly be termed
cosmopolitan.
2. The politics of depoliticisation and the juridifi cation of European 
identity 
Historically, the politics of the European Union has disavowed a 
strong conception of democratic agonism, instead seeking to neutralise
conflict and to draw upon consensual threads of a ‘thin’ universalistic
identity. The pillars of European integration have been economic pros-
perity, transnational legal regulation, and international security.5 In
this respect, the core of European politics has been and continues to  
be colonised by the logics of economics and law.6 Because judicial deci-
sion-making has channelled and driven European integration, Europe’s
supranational political space has therefore been to a considerable degree
depoliticised. The question of a freely constituted European people’s self-
identification, let alone of its self-legislation, has fallen altogether from
view. While it may seem trite, today, to observe that the European public
sphere is weak and underdeveloped,7 it nevertheless remains the case
5  Here, the public law institutions of Europe have not been grounded in anything resem-
bling polemos or hostis. See Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (University of Chicago 
1996) 46-7. While Schmitt’s friend/enemy distinction ought not be embraced in its existen-
tial-ontological sense, it is helpful analytically in highlighting the deficiencies of the legalis-
tic European model. For Schmitt, liberalism’s focus on the moralistic and economic aspects 
of law marginalises the political concepts of conflict and confrontation with the enemy. In 
this light, the European legal space rests on fundamentally depoliticised and demilitarised 
concepts, having as its goal precisely to make politics safe, ‘to annihilate the political as a 
domain of conquering power and repression’. ibid 71. 
6  See Jirˇí Prˇíbánˇ, Legal Symbolism: On Law, Time and European Identity (Ashgate 2007) 
117. 
7  Debates over the European Union’s ‘democratic deficit’, of course, have long fl ooded 
legal and political science journals. See, eg, Giandomenico Majone, ‘Europe’s “Democratic 
Deficit”: The Question of Standards’ (1998) 4 ELJ 5; F. Decker, ‘Governance Beyond the Na-
tion-State, Reflections on the Democratic Deficit of the European Union’ (2002) 9 Journal 
of European Public Policy 256; A Føllesdal & S Hix, ‘Why There is a Democratic Defi cit in 
the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik’ (2005) Eur. Governance Papers, No C-05-
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that Europe has yet either to find or to found the demos for which the 
European Union stands as a hollow placeholder.
There is a sense in which this development might not trouble us. We
might conclude, for example, that the process of civic interpellation sim-
ply takes time and that the founding paradox of Europe will resolve itself
just as Jean Monnet’s neo-functional integration had imagined all those 
years ago: politics will, indeed, follow step by step the path of econom-
ics, and ‘governance’ will surely turn into ‘government’.8 Or, rather, we 
might assert along constructivist lines that new models of constitutional
dialogue and public contestation among a diverse set of elite political ac-
tors might inspire new forms of solidaristic attachment currently elud-
ing European civic psychology. But there are reasons, precisely in these 
times of severe economic crisis and political unrest, to be less optimistic. 
There are reasons to question the power of legal-technocratic coordina-
tion to inspire the broader civic solidarity upon which a European demos
must ultimately depend.9 There are reasons, in other words, to begin the 
search for an alternative path towards a European future. 
Our problem appears in greatest relief when we consider the na-
ture of the constitutionalised European legal order: namely, the extent
to which Europe has adopted the functional equivalent of a constitution
through the treaties that established and expanded the European Com-
munity. This movement towards integration has been guided, above all, 
by legal formalism - and has involved many of its corresponding fl aws.
While European institutions - both supranational and national - have
disseminated harmonised legal norms, their systems-coordination logic
has accordingly neglected the symbolic dimension of democratic political 
identity. Put simply, Europe has inaugurated a new constitutional struc-
ture while leaving democracy behind, and it is now increasingly doubtful 
that a supranational European identity can continue to be articulated
02 <http://www.connex- network.org/eurogov/pdf/egp-connex-C-05-02.pdf> accessed 10 
June 2012; Andrew Moravcsik, ‘In Defense of the “Democratic Deficit”: Reassessing Legiti-
macy in the European Union’ (2002) 40 Journal of Common Market Studies 603; Andrew 
Moravcsik, ‘The Myth of Europe’s “Democratic Deficit”’ (2008) Intereconomics: Journal of 
European Economic Policy 331. 
8  See, eg, Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Lib-
eral Intergovernmentalist Approach’ in S Bulmer & A Scott (eds), Economic and Political 
Integration: Internal Dynamics and Global Context (Blackwell Publishing 1994) 29-80. This 
approach is currently on view in the latest intergovernmental agreements on a closer Euro-
pean fi scal union, pushed through in a time of great economic emergency with constrained 
public debate. 
9  Some theories might wish to sidestep the demos altogether, but I believe that the ques-
tion of a redefined European democratic polity remains indispensible to imagining a fully 
free European citizenry. Without the coherence of a European demos as a referential ideal, 
possibilities for democratic civic action would be signifi cantly foreclosed. 
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through legality alone. Indeed, today Europe appears to be at a paradoxi-
cal and uncertain moment in its development.10 
At issue here is the very legitimacy of the European project. While
modern political legitimacy certainly inheres partially in legal form and 
in the provision of rights under the rule of law, legitimacy also requires
its democratic dimension: the participation of the people in a political 
project they can intelligibly call their own.11 The processes of European
integration have harnessed the former while essentially dispensing with
the latter. 
Legally and institutionally, it must be said that the European
cosmopolitan achievement is considerable: the arrangement of a discrete 
European system of government and the interpenetration of national
and European laws in a trans-European ‘constitutional’ system of rights
protection and judicial review.12 In large part, the European Union’s 
authority no longer relies strictly on the mediation of national political
structures, though often the latter serve to accredit superficially the de-
cisions of the former. European law occupies an effectively autonomous 
sphere, with its own endogenous conditions for legality and validity. The 
jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice and the preliminary refer-
ence procedure under Article 234 TEC/Article 267 TFEU successfully
pierced national court systems and activated national judges as agents
of the European legal order.13 Through its jurisprudential doctrine of su-
10  As Hauke Brunkhorst has observed, ‘The already quite advanced status of European 
constitution making is simultaneously increasing both the chance for a transition from a 
weak to a very strong European public sphere, and the danger of constitutionally solidifying 
the de-democratization of Europe and its nations’. Hauke Brunkhorst, Solidarity: From Civic 
Friendship to a Global Legal Community (MIT Press 2005) 163-4. The longevity of the fi scal 
union and its impact on political integration—noting the dissenting voices of the United 
Kingdom and the Czech Republic, as well as the deepening economic crisis in Greece—re-
main to be seen. 
11  This distinction is often made in terms of ‘output-legitimation’ and ‘input-legitimation’. 
See ibid 139-40. 
12 See JHH Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’ (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal 2403. In 
1986, for example, the European Court of Justice noted ‘that the European Economic Com-
munity is a Community based on the rule of law, inasmuch as neither its Member States 
nor its institutions can avoid a review of the question whether the measure adopted by 
them are in conformity with the basic constitutional charter, the Treaty.” Case 294/83 Parti 
Ecologiste ‘Les Verts’ v Parliament [1986] ECR 1339, para 23. Moreover, the European Court 
of Human Rights has itself called the European Convention ‘a constitutional document’ of 
European public law. Loizidou v Turkey App no 15318/89 (ECHR 23 March 1995). 
13  Treaty on Functioning of the European Union, Consolidated Version, 30 March 2010, 
art 267 [2010] OJ C83/47. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
183 CYELP 8 [2012] 175-226 
premacy14 and the direct15 and indirect16 effect of European law in vari-
ous policy areas, the European Court of Justice over time has fashioned 
the hierarchical constitutionalisation of the European treaty system. 
Nevertheless, EU judicialisation has failed to inspire an attendant 
political-psychological transformation in the consciousness of newly
minted European citizens. This failure is attributable in no small part
to the fact that, precisely on the symbolic level of political identity, Euro-
pean functional constitutionalism offers a severely anaemic alternative
to national constitutional law. European law engages Europeans not as
authors of the law of which they are ultimately subjects but rather as the
juridified objects of a new, if increasingly harmonised, regulatory appa-
ratus. Hauke Brunkhorst cites the following deficiencies in the EU legal 
framework: ‘discrimination of residents, potential deportation of EU citi-
zens out of individual countries, democratically insufficient rights to par-
ticipation, privileging of the executive and the state apparatus’.17 While it
is true that the European treaty system has been steadily evolving and
can be changed, the degree to which individual citizens infl uence this 
change is constrained and heavily mediated by bureaucracy, legal-ex-
pert regulation, and other elite, non-democratic organs. European Union 
law responds to the need for further integration in systems-structural
terms, not necessarily in terms of the communal self-identifi cation that
normally accompanies democratic constitutional development.18 
In the EU, elite executive organs of treaty-ratifying countries along-
side transnational legal processes - and not European citizens or their 
direct representatives - are the authors of constitutional change in any 
proximate and meaningful sense.19 Moreover, the customary parliamen-
14  Supremacy operates here in the sense that Community law cannot be overridden by do-
mestic statute, contrary to the general principle of lex posteriori. Case 6/64 Flaminio Costa 
v ENEL [1964] ECR 585. Later, the ECJ confirmed further that Community law cannot be 
overridden even by the basic constitutional law of a European Member State. Case 11/70 
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratstelle für Getreide und Futter-
mittel [1970] ECR 1125. See also Case 106/77 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v 
Simmenthal SpA [1978] ECR 629. 
15  See Case 26/62 NV Algemene Transporten Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en Loos v 
Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1. 
16  See Case 106/89 Marleasing SA v Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA [1990] 
ECR I-7321. 
17  Brunkhorst (n 10) 165. 
18  ‘To put it plainly, [the European constitutional framework] is less protected against 
non-egalitarian and manipulative interventions and encroachments than typical national 
constitutions’. ibid 165. See also Weiler (n 12) 2405-6; and JHH Weiler, ‘The Reformation of 
European Constitutionalism’ (1997) 1 Journal of Common Market Studies 97-8. 
19  Alec Stone Sweet has recently written about the emergent ‘cosmopolitan legal order’ 
within the European Union. In particular, the rights-oriented jurisprudence of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights and the adoption of Protocol No 11 (conferring compulsory 
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tary mechanisms of European Member States are themselves increas-
ingly marginalised in political decision-making at the supranational lev-
el. While there have been significant referenda and an increased interest
in the European Parliament, real authority and control still lie with the 
European executive organs and, more subtly, with the latent legal evolu-
tion of transnational economic regulation, or the new lex mercatoria.20 
Further, the ability to initiate legislation continues to rest with the non-
democratic European Commission, as national or European parliamen-
tary competency is limited largely to the comparatively weak powers of
veto, consultation, supervision, and amendment.21 The modern political
sources of solidarity, emerging from democratic processes of self-legisla-
tion and normative self-identification, are thus in the European Union 
invariably confused, diluted, and undermined.22 
Today, this same crisis in the democratisation of European power 
is visible in the intergovernmental terms of the emerging fi scal compact.
Under the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance, Europe-
an heads of state of the European Council would be granted far-reach-
ing powers to annul budgetary policies of national parliaments.23 The
jurisdiction over individual petitions) have ensured the domestic incorporation of transna-
tional European norms. Alec Stone Sweet, ‘A Europe of Courts: Constitutional Pluralism 
and Rights Cosmopolitanism’ (2011) Law and Globalization Seminar, Spring 2011, Yale Law 
School, draft. I consider the rights protections afforded by the ECHR and its dialogic rela-
tionship with domestic courts to be no doubt a welcome development that ought be praised 
and valued. Nevertheless, in the context of post-national identity formation, I also take it 
to be an incomplete development: in connecting individuals to a supranational court, it 
remains too embedded in the legalism I have been discussing above. For this kind of rights 
cosmopolitanism to penetrate the symbolic political universe, it is in need of extra-legal 
supplement, an additional channel for the expressions of solidarity. See also Alec Stone 
Sweet, The Judicial Construction of Europe (OUP 2004). 
20  See, eg, Alec Stone Sweet, ‘The New Lex Mercatoria and Transnational Governance’ 
(2006) 13 Journal of European Public Policy 627. 
21  See Weiler, ‘Reformation of European Constitutionalism’ (n 18) 113. 
22  As Brunkhorst puts it: ‘Although citizens were long ago recognized as subjects of integra-
tion in status activus, the status activus of the people of the Union has been up to now only 
nominal-symbolic constitutional law: legal text, but no concretized legal norm’. Brunkhorst 
(n10) 172. The marginalisation of democratic legitimacy is perhaps reaching its crisis point. 
Today, in the face of the sovereign debt crisis, democracy in certain states has been ef-
fectively suspended, virtually forgotten as an important factor in addressing national and 
European problems. Both Italy and Greece have recently acquired apolitical technocrats as 
interim heads of government (Italy’s entire Cabinet is comprised of technical experts), and 
parliamentary democracy has been progressively marginalised to the point where it is regu-
larly overruled by executive emergency decision. While administrative governments have 
calmed the nerves of the European Central Bank and the international fi nancial markets, 
they have unwittingly exacerbated the very crisis of legitimation that plagued the European 
Union to begin with. See generally Jürgen Habermas, On Europe’s Constitution—An Essay
(Suhrkamp 2011). 
23 See Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary 
Union (Fiscal Treaty) 2 March 2012, arts 5 and 6. 
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Treaty, though explicitly requiring profound changes to be incorporated
into Eurozone members’ constitutions,24 is carefully constructed to avoid 
referenda.25 Jürgen Habermas has recently written on the potential un-
democratic consequences of the emergency measures, a reckoning with
‘a post-democratic empowerment of the executive on an unprecedented 
scale’.26 Habermas notes that ‘the “economic dialogue” foreseen by the 
permissive clause in paragraph 2h [Article 11c] of the . . . resolution of
the European Parliament of 28 September 2011 is not sufficient to close 
this [democratic legitimacy] gap’.27 
Thus, at stake in recent moves toward European integration is the 
critical distinction between (a) having secure access to an array of mod-
ern rights and (b) achieving that access intelligibly as democratic sub-
jects. What might objectively be an inspiring and progressive realisa-
tion of human rights remains subjectively (that is, for individual citizens
themselves) a hierarchically structured deliverance from above, from a 
technocratic legal apparatus that - though benevolent - is unmistakably
distant. It remains, with only some exaggeration, almost foreign, which
is to say, removed from immediate procedures of democratic legitimation
and political self-identification. Thus, even the sophisticated process of
European constitutionalisation cannot replace entirely the symbolic ac-
tivity of European identity-formation and its associated civic imaginary.
As Ian Ward argues, legalism alone is insufficient to ground what he
calls a new European public philosophy: 
24  Para 15 of the Preamble to the Fiscal Treaty reads: ‘NOTING that compliance with the 
obligation to transpose the “Balanced Budget Rule” into national legal systems through 
binding and permanent provisions, preferably constitutional, should be subject to the ju-
risdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union…’ (emphasis supplied). Art 3 para 
3 further stipulates that ‘[t]he rules shall take effect in the national law of the Contracting 
Parties… through provisions of binding force and permanent character, preferably constitu-
tional, or otherwise guaranteed to be fully respected and adhered to throughout the national 
budgetary processes’ (emphasis added). Germany, the driving force behind the Fiscal Trea-
ty, amended its Constitution in 2009 to require that a balanced budget (Schuldenbremse
or ‘debt brake’) on both the federal and the state levels be gradually introduced, with 2020 
as the final date after which no deficit would be permitted. In November 2011, the Austrian 
government agreed to a similar amendment, while comparable provisions had already been 
adopted in the 1990s by Switzerland, Estonia, and Poland. 
25  In a surprising move, the Irish government decided to call a referendum. Valentina Pop, 
‘Ireland to Hold Referendum on Fiscal Compact’ EUObserver (28 February 2012) <http:// 
euobserver.com/18/115412> accessed 10 June 2012. The Fiscal Treaty nonetheless has 
a safety valve that protects it from being blocked by a minority of Member States. It is for-
mally excluded from the EU constitutional framework, thereby allowing the Member States 
to circumvent the traditional amendment provision of the TEU, that is, ratification by all 27 
Member States. The new Treaty will take effect after ratification by 12 states. 
26  Jürgen Habermas, ‘Bringing the Integration of Citizens into Line with the Integration 
of States’ (12 March 2012) ResetDOC (Ciaran Cronin, tr) <http://www.resetdoc.org/sto-
ry/00000021925> accessed 10 June 2012. 
27 ibid. 
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A public philosophy is a state of mind, something refined by the 
political imagination. It is, ultimately, a matter of belief. If Europe 
has a future, it must be something that Europeans believe in, not 
something the legitimacy of which is assigned merely by treaties and 
courts of law.28 
Or, as Joseph Weiler writes rather bluntly: ‘The ability to go to court
to enjoy a right bestowed on you by the pleasure of others does not eman-
cipate you, does not make you a citizen’.29 While a transnational cosmo-
politan law might serve to reduce reliance on ethnic identity as a holistic
category,30 it nevertheless cannot at the same time inspire attachment
to a new European demos, as such. In short, it cannot substitute for a 
participatory European democratic politics, through which new political 
subjects and a new political solidarity can emerge. 
When we speak of the political imagination or of democratic emanci-
pation, we therefore arrive at the intrinsic limits of transnational consti-
tutional law. Missing is the moment of will,31 in which Europeans could
demand that the text of this constitutional shell be presented to the people
directly for a world-creating moment of constitution.32 In other words, for
the European public space to be realised coherently, European constitu-
tionalisation must be a process attained and claimed by the demos for
28  Ian Ward, ‘Beyond Constitutionalism: The Search for a European Political Imagination’ 
(2001) 7 European Law Journal 24, 25. 
29  JHH Weiler, ‘To Be a European Citizen—Eros and Civilization’ (1997) 4 Journal of Eu-
ropean Public Policy 503; see also Weiler, ‘Reformation of European Constitutionalism’ (n 
18) 114-5. 
30 I should stress here that this value should rightfully be celebrated as a signifi cant achieve-
ment of the European project. Nevertheless, as I discuss later, in order for this cosmopolitan
accomplishment to endure and to continue to guide our political consciousness into the
future, it must confront the question of its own political legitimacy. In the absence of such
legitimacy, cosmopolitan virtue will be unable to compete practically and symbolically with
the nationalist responses that are already appearing today. Indeed, because we have, in the
end, depoliticised our politics, the logics of xenophobia, chauvinism, and anti-immigrant rac-
ism have taken hold in even the traditionally most progressive of states (see the recent French
and Dutch moves to ban wearing the burqa in public). See below section 4. 
31  See Paul W Kahn, Putting Liberalism in Its Place (Princeton UP 2004); Paul W Kahn, Out 
of Eden: Adam and Eve and the Problem of Evil (Princeton UP 2006); Paul W Kahn, Political 
Theology: Four New Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (Columbia UP 2011). 
32 See Brunkhorst (n 10) 174. I want to stress that the issue encountered here does not 
concern, in particular, the incomplete formation of a State, as such (namely a European 
super-state). The process of constitutionalisation does not logically assume the creation of 
a unified State but leaves contingent various institutional configurations that might retain 
core competencies within federated and diverse jurisdictions. Indeed, it would diminish the 
noble ambitions of the European Union simply to recreate the ‘nation’-state, with all of its 
failings, at the European level. See below, sections 3 and 4. The point here, rather, is that, 
in order for any European project on the supranational level to proceed with the confi dence 
and trust of European citizens, constitutionalisation must find points of reference in par-
ticipatory, democratic processes of self-identifi cation. 
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itself. The constituent power cannot be brought into being retroactively.
The demos cannot be freely formed through laws of which it is not at the
same time the author. Democratic identity - and its attendant civic virtues
of trust and solidarity - simply cannot be bootstrapped in this way. 
The legalistic nature of Europe’s founding thus lingers as a paradox
of identity that presents longer-term, structural challenges for European
enlargement and integration. What might the concept of a new European
public philosophy concretely mean, and in what structures might it be
expressed? From where might a European political identity emerge? How 
might it be put into practice and lived by European citizens? 
The proclamations of EU law provide little help here. Article 49 of the 
Treaty of the European Union states that ‘[a]ny European State which re-
spects the values referred to in Article 2 and is committed to promoting 
them may apply to become a member of the Union’.33 Article 2 enumer-
ates the ‘values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equal-
ity, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of
persons belonging to minorities’ and indicates that they are ‘common 
to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimina-
tion, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men 
prevail’.34 Nevertheless, the contours of a specifically European identity
- apart from a vacuously thin declaration of liberal democratic princi-
ples - are entirely underdetermined. Furthermore, Article 4.2 empha-
sises that the Union ‘shall respect [Member States’] national identities, 
inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, 
inclusive of regional and local self-government’.35 And yet, once again, 
the relationship between a new European political consciousness and 
familiar national identities is rendered very much unclear. Further, if left
unresolved politically, this ambiguity will very likely be corrosive of the
future relevance and legitimacy of the European project, especially with
regard to the ‘additional’ European citizenship granted at Maastricht.36 
As Étienne Balibar writes: 
[I]t is difficult to conceive of supranational institutions being rec-
ognized as legitimate if they do not procure for the individuals they 
bring together an at least equal (and in fact greater) level of security 
and degree of democratic participation than existed in the frame-
work of traditional nation-states.37 
33  Treaty on European Union, Consolidated Version, 30 March 2010, art 49 [2010] OJ 
C83/01 (hereinafter Consolidated TEU). 
34  ibid, art 2. 
35  ibid, art 4.2. 
36  See ibid, art 9. 
37 Étienne Balibar, We, the People of Europe? (Princeton UP 2004) 43. 
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This legitimation gap is exacerbated in times of economic crisis and,
despite recent elite moves to push forward ever-closer political union at
the institutional level, this deficit exposes the European project to the 
perils of populist and xenophobic eruptions. These eruptions are echoed
in Europe’s strict policing of its external boundaries and its increasingly
hostile immigration policies. There is every reason to fear that, if Europe
cannot find a way to re-democratise and re-legitimate itself and its con-
stitutional framework, the regression to older forms of chauvinism could 
be serious, indeed.
If the question of the demos as such is to be framed properly, the
issue of political identity must be addressed directly (and certainly must
not be limited to the formal discourse of public law). Indeed, this core 
political question ought to be a locus of prolonged public contestation, 
through which provisional and plural self-understandings might slowly
emerge: Why ought a unified Europe exist at all? For what purpose ought 
its citizens work together as participants in a common political project?38 
In order to better understand the limits of European constitutionalism
and the promise of a European democratic cosmopolitanism, I now turn
in greater detail to the interplay of law and politics, of governance and 
democratic freedom, of constitutional principle and public trust. 
3. From constitutional patriotism to the perpetual paradox of 
politics 
The construction of a distinctly transnational European legal land-
scape over the past decades confronts us as European citizens with a con-
spicuous problem: how do we, as democratic subjects, find autonomy and
freedom in relation to a framework of laws not strictly or intelligibly of our
creation? In a certain sense, the European dilemma is at heart a dilemma
of constitutional democracy itself, faced by all peoples who decide to found
38  See generally Jürgen Habermas, The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays (Polity 
Press 2001) 60-1. In this sense, it is a great hope that—should the new Treaty on Stability, 
Coordination and Governance inspire a broader public debate about European economic 
and social policy—this debate would reflect upon the question of political identity and inter-
rogate the European project conceived not as super-state but as ‘post-national constella-
tion’. The fear, of course, is that such a debate will instead rather quickly lapse into tech-
nocratic legalism and economic determinism with few opportunities for more widespread 
civic participation. This is the democratic tragedy behind the Greek bailouts. Even taking 
account of the severe economic concerns, Papandreou’s initial appeal for a referendum on 
an issue of fateful importance to Greek citizens was met with vitriol from European political 
elites and bankers. The dividing line between democratic political accountability and eco-
nomic necessity had never been greater. The crisis confronted citizens with a corrosive false 
choice: either be bad democrats or be bad Europeans. See, eg, Costas Lapavitsas, ‘Greece 
Crisis: Papandreou’s Referendum is a Gamble Too Far’ The Guardian (1 November 2011) 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/nov/01/greece-crisispapandreou-ref-
erendum-gamble> accessed 10 June 2012. 
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their democratic life with reference to a binding constitutional text. Our
civic alienation from European law is therefore in part a problem common
to all forms of constitutional law. The laws that bind us belong always al-
ready to the past; they are not necessarily ‘of our time,’ despite their con-
tinual translation. The past legislates over the present, the present over the
future.39 Here, the constitution is distinct from the people at any one point,
and the rule of law stands above the simple (majoritarian) self-rule of men.
And, yet, we as Europeans are alienated from EU law doubly: not 
only by time but also by what we might perceive to be a spatial-hierarchi-
cal divide. This divide, perhaps even more than the temporal disjunction, 
is exacerbated by the democratic deficit described above, in which the 
EU functional constitutionalisation lacks its proper constituent power 
or founding moment. This second alienation from Europe concerns the
struggle between the supranational intergovernmental project, on the 
one hand, and particular national attachments and histories, on the
other. More broadly, in the language of human rights protection, it is  
the struggle between universality and particularity, between universal 
moral principles and particular cultural-political ethics. We frequently
speak about this dilemma with metaphors of spatial distance and order-
ing: a ‘universal’ Europe that spans or crosses the boundaries of indi-
vidual nation-states. Brussels is presented as all but a ‘foreign country’, 
and universality is cast as a questionable intrusion of international law 
into the particular value spheres of a national polity. 
The discords of past and present thus overlap with the tensions of
the universal and the particular, and today’s European citizens engage
in a situated democracy continuously confronted by a constitutional past
and an abstract, distant universalism. The European Union, therefore,
is perpetually ‘out of joint’ with our democratic selfhood. 
In response, Jürgen Habermas has proposed a theory of constitu-
tionalism that would dissolve this dilemma and thereby ease the alien-
ation of European citizens from the structures of European law.40 Haber-
39  Some thinkers have argued that this structure means that constitutional democracy 
must therefore be considered an intergenerational project that actualises freedom and au-
tonomy only through time. See, eg, Stephen Holmes, ‘Precommitment and the Paradox of 
Democracy’ in Jon Elster (ed), Constitutionalism and Democracy (CUP 1988); Jed Ruben-
feld, Freedom and Time: A Theory of Constitutional Self-Government (Yale UP 2001). In this 
sense, the dilemma is in effect no dilemma at all, as the discomfort of illegitimacy dissipates 
amidst talk of heirs and beneficiaries united through quasi-mythical national experience. 
This mythology is, of course, precisely what Europe in the end lacks, and this lack is re-
lated to the second (spatial) line of alienation. As we shall see, Habermas attempts a similar 
conceptual move with his discourse theory of law, where freedom is ultimately harnessed in 
constitution-making through time. 
40  See generally Jürgen Habermas, ‘Citizenship and National Identity: Some Refl ections 
on the Future of Europe’ (1992) 12(1) Praxis Intl 1; Jürgen Habermas, ‘Why Europe Needs 
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mas rejects the antagonism of law and democracy and argues that they
are instead mutually constitutive, dependent on one another for their 
full realisation. For Habermas, therefore, constitutional democracy at
the European level promises to overcome the divisions of particular na-
tional interests without undermining civic democratic life itself. As I will
argue, however, Habermas’s approach is ultimately insufficient either to 
ease or to remove the gap in European democratic legitimation. 
Habermas advises that the European nation-state’s internal rela-
tionship between republicanism and nationalism be reconsidered. While 
it may admittedly be impossible to remove wholly the pre-political basis 
of collective identity from legal process, pre-political identities might nev-
ertheless be progressively reformulated by the discursive procedures of
constitution-making. Indeed, as the growing diversity of cultural forms of
life and worldviews renders homogeneity impossible as a form of national
grounding, the impulses of republicanism must be strengthened and 
re-emphasised. ‘The central idea of republicanism’, Habermas writes, ‘is 
that the democratic process can serve . . . as a guarantor for the social
integration of an increasingly differentiated society’.41 In this sense, the
common political culture of a state is gradually decoupled from pre-polit-
ical identities or sub-political cultural foundations. Habermas proposes
that the constitution be the formal means by which a ‘national culture 
develops a distinctive interpretation of those constitutional principles
that are equally embodied in other republican constitutions - such as
popular sovereignty and human rights - in light of its own national his-
tory’.42 
As such, the constitutional legal order and its accompanying con-
stitutional patriotism - the affective attachment to the system of rights
protection - might effectively displace nationalist recognition and its 
harmful particularist tendencies. In its stead, constitutional patriotism
would champion a procedural basis for social cohesion and identity-for-
mation within a post-metaphysical, pluralistic polity. Habermas thereby,
in part, acknowledges the dual nature of universalism, which is both
destabilised by yet also dependent upon its instantiation within ‘binding’
particular identities.43 He has observed, ‘On the basis of universalistic
norms, no particular entity possessing an identity-forming power [such
as the family, tribe, or nation] can set up bounds to demarcate itself from
a Constitution’ (2001) 11 New Left Rev 5; and Jürgen Habermas, ‘Toward a Cosmopolitan 
Europe’ (2003) 14(4) Journal of Democracy 86. 
41  Habermas, ‘European Nation-State’ (n 3) 408. 
42 ibid. 
43  See, eg, Patchen Markell, ‘Making Affect Safe for Democracy? On “Constitutional Patriot-
ism”’ (2000) 28(1) Political Theory 38, 41. 
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alien groups’.44 Nevertheless, Habermas’s response is to insist that ‘basic
norms of rational discourse’ can themselves ground a collective identity
through which universal principles will assume a social reality and be
interpreted practically through particular cultural lenses.45  In the end,
a post-metaphysical, procedurally guided collectivity would self-identify 
with the common ‘consciousness of [a] universal and equal opportunity 
to participate in value and norm-forming learning processes’.46 
For Habermas, constitutional patriotism is a mode of civic belonging 
that has shed its dependence on a pre-political referent and instead has 
found a legitimating core in precisely its self-conception as a ‘self-deter-
mining political community’.47 The hope of constitutional patriotism, in
short, is to retain the affective identification of democratic politics while
tethering that affect to rationally grounded moral and political principles. 
In so doing, constitutional patriotism offers a political framework that
would actively valorise democratic interpretations of universal norms
without necessarily marginalising minority groups as a community’s 
Other. Indeed, the process of contestation would serve, under constitu-
tional principles, to integrate individuals into a discursive community 
through which identities could be reconstructed refl exively.
Nonetheless, it remains contested whether constitutional patriotism
per Habermas’s formulation can provide an adequate response to the 
demands being made on the European nation-state both by economic
integration and by multiculturalism. In particular, in its attempt to rec-
oncile the narratives of technocratic and economic globalisation with the
relations of social solidarity, constitutional patriotism expounds a rather
limited view of political culture and of its role in nurturing the very
identities required by democratic politics.48 On Habermas’s reading of
the development of modernity and the emergence of a post-metaphysical 
age, the public justification of communal norms nevertheless still refers
to a disembodied ‘ideal speech situation’ expressed in abstractly aligned 
constitutional procedures and human rights. While Seyla Benhabib has 
44  Jürgen Habermas, ‘On Social Identity’ (1974) 19 Telos 94. 
45  ibid 100. 
46 ibid. 
47  Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law 
and Democracy (William Rehg tr, MIT Press 1998) [1992] 496. In a sense, constitutional 
patriotism is Habermas’s attempt to make progress on the problem of collective identity dis-
tinct to modernity. Indeed, it might be seen as an attempt to generalise the civic nationalism 
that had successfully emerged within a select group of nation-states in Western Europe and 
within the United States. 
48  Patchen Markell has criticised Habermas’s constitutional patriotism precisely as an 
example of a ‘strategy of redirection’, which ‘rests on a misleading picture of the dynamics 
of political affect and, in particular, of the relationship between affect and the universal 
principles that supposedly are represented by the civic [order]’..Markell (n 43) 39. 
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since reformulated this interaction of the universal with particular po-
litical-cultural communities in her concept of ‘democratic iterations’,49 
we might stress that a modern constitutional process must resonate not 
only with a system of abstract rights but also with a deeper social imagi-
nary that itself shapes communal life and political possibility.50 It is this 
latter social imaginary that, though it is crucial to the success of any
project of constitutional patriotism, is less well developed in the Haber-
masian model. 
Along these lines, Craig Calhoun helpfully distinguishes between 
the notions of constitution as legal framework and constitution as the cre-
ation of concrete social relationships, each of which is necessary for a 
fully developed constitutional-democratic system.51 On this account, the
mutual commitments made by individuals within a constitutionally in-
stituted and legally structured public sphere depend not only on the law 
but also on solidarity, on a reciprocally embraced orientation to fellow 
citizens and to the political process.52 Calhoun stresses ‘the role of pub-
lic life in actually constituting social solidarity and creating culture’ and 
includes within the processes of public deliberation ‘modes of cultural
creativity and communication not the less valuable for being incomplete-
ly rational’.53 This richer form of democratic political culture signifi es, in
part, the indirect effect of politics on a society’s system of cultural repro-
duction and collective self-identification. In this sense, the demos tran-
scends the political or constitutional context and, more exactly, ‘serves
as the source of identity, morals, emotions, and collective behaviors . . . 
[shaping] a socially specifi c habitus’.54 A true political culture enables a 
strong sense of shared responsibility and a duty of civic participation.55 
In the end, Calhoun’s intervention aims to make Habermas’s constitu-
49  See, eg, Seyla Benhabib, The Rights of Others: Aliens, Citizens and Residents (CUP 2004); 
Seyla Benhabib, Another Cosmopolitanism (Robert Post ed, OUP 2005); Seyla Benhabib, 
‘Democratic Exclusions and Democratic Iterations: Dilemmas of “Just Membership” and 
Prospects of Cosmopolitan Federalism’ (2007) 6 European Journal of Political Theory 445-
62. 
50  In this sense, we might recall Hannah Arendt’s analysis of revolution as a founding par 
excellence, as a rupture through which public action opens upon a new world and, indeed, 
shapes a new future. See Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (Penguin 1977). 
51  Craig Calhoun, ‘Imagining Solidarity: Cosmopolitanism, Constitutional Patriotism, and 
the Public Sphere’ (2002) 14(1) Public Culture 152-3. 
52  Calhoun points to the Hegelian dialectic of the whole and its parts as part of the very 
essence of modernity’s relation between the individual and the nation, as they are ‘complicit 
with each other’ and ‘continue to inform each other’. ibid 154. 
53  ibid 155. 
54  Dominique Schnapper, Community of Citizens: On the Modern Idea of Nationality (Trans-
action Pub 1998) 85. 
55  See Jeremy Waldron, ‘Cultural Identity and Civic Responsibility’ in W Kymlicka & W Nor-
man (eds), Citizenship in Diverse Societies (OUP 2000) 155-74, 155. 
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tional patriotism responsive not only to universal principles of inclusion
and procedural coherence but also to the demands of social solidarity
and to the questions of motivation and trust. 
In this vein, while I share Habermas’s hope for a refl exive recon-
struction of political identity, I believe that Habermas’s constitutional
patriotism suffers from several shortcomings. Perhaps most important is 
the problem of motivation: the extent to which citizens are able to retain
genuinely and deeply held attachments to abstract constitutional prin-
ciples is uncertain - no matter how sensitively such abstractions might 
be interpreted alongside particular cultural histories. Even were this to
be affirmed, the question remains why individual citizens would be moti-
vated in the first place to participate in the processes of democratic itera-
tion.56  Put simply, absent from our account of constitutional patriotism
is a fuller articulation of post-nationalist participatory-political identity, 
an identity that would recognise and support legitimate democratic opin-
ion- and will-formation. 
Seyla Benhabib has argued that jurisgenerative politics are always 
negotiated in a dialectic of universalistic norms and particular contents
dictated by the ‘horizons’ of identity, culture, and institutions.57 Haber-
mas himself writes that the norm-justification inherent to constitutional
patriotism requires a ‘mature capacity for moral judgment’ which inte-
grates both ‘cognitive operations and emotional dispositions and atti-
tudes’ in the participants’ performative frame.58 Thus, rational justifi ca-
tion and subjective affect must operate jointly. However, this inter-con-
nection remains frayed or, at the very least, underdeveloped. Because the 
willingness to engage in such responsible negotiation seems to be depen-
dent on some form of the above political identity, the concept of consti-
tutional patriotism thus conceived may remain (viciously) circular: our 
cohesive identities emerge as shaped by political processes, but to par-
ticipate fully in those processes requires the very identities these same
processes are supposed to constitute. In other words, a demos capable of
embracing liberal-democratic principles requires a desire on the part of
56  Sharon Krause has interpreted this ‘motivational deficit’ in terms of the division in Hab-
ermas’s work between the moral and the ethical and has questioned whether this strict 
distinction, if the discourse ethical project is to be successful, can remain. She worries, in 
the end, the demands of universal proceduralism—and the infusion of reflexivity into what 
was previously an ethical domain with its particular form of the good—might result in a 
‘loss of confidence in reason and the end of rational discourse as a normative ideal’. Sharon 
Krause, ‘Desiring Justice: Motivation and Justifi cation in Rawls and Habermas’ (2005) 4(4) 
Contemporary Political Theory 374. 
57  See Seyla Benhabib, ‘Claiming Rights Across Borders: International Human Rights and 
Democratic Sovereignty’ (2009) 103(4) American Political Science Review 691-704. 
58  Jürgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (C Lenhardt and SW 
Nicholsen trs, MIT Press 1996) 182. 
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that community to determine legitimately the course of its communal life
- that is to say, requires a desire for the very liberal-democratic principles 
we need to explain. 
Here, patriotic attachment to liberal-democratic principles obliges 
an aspiration to a particular kind of self-determining politics, a legitimate 
kind in which discourse is open to all affected. Missing again seems to 
be an account of the origins of participatory-political solidarity - of the 
kind adequate to inspire sacrifice and even love for our neighbours, for 
the state as a whole, for strangers within our expanding symbolic uni-
verse - that can animate universalising inclusion, in the first place, while
remaining relevant to particular ethical constructs. Without such an
articulation, the project of cosmopolitan patriotism is in danger of short-
circuiting, failing to ever truly develop in a way recognisable to itself and 
to its intended normative commitments. 
Moreover, amidst this deficit of solidarity within constitutional
patriotism returns the spectre of the political. As cosmopolitan or su-
pranational projects develop - even as outgrowths of the process of glo-
balisation - political reactions invoking more insular and less inclusive 
versions of social solidarity materialise in response. If constitutional pa-
triotism is to provide a fruitful model for the continued expansion of
European cosmopolitan ideals into the realm of practice, its resilience 
in the face of the political question - and with it the problems of motiva-
tion and of solidarity - becomes increasingly salient. Indeed, Habermas
himself has recognised the possible limitations of his approach and has 
posed the critical question in this way: ‘Under what conditions can a 
liberal political culture provide a sufficient cushion to prevent a nation
of citizens, which can no longer rely on ethnic associations, from dis-
solving into fragments?’59 In fact, Habermas supplements the concep-
tual co-originality of constitutionalism and democracy with reference to 
empirical events, namely the constitutional assemblies of Philadelphia
and Paris.60 Thus, we already have - even within the context-transcend-
ing procedures of constitutionalism - an appeal to the exogenous traces
of political affect, to the particular emotions of the founding moment of
democratic politics.61 
59  Habermas, ‘European Nation-State’ (n 3) 408. 
60 See Jürgen Habermas, ‘Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of Contradictory 
Principles?’ (2001) 29 Political Theory 766, 768. 
61  In the following sections, I work to outline what such traces of political affect and po-
litical subjectivity might be in the context of the construction of European supranational 
identity. 
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Étienne Balibar summarises this point nicely: 
[W]hat cannot work here is a unitary or federal formal constitution 
considered to be a ‘fundamental law’ (Grundgesetz) or a catalog of 
democratic rules and principles that would have to be intellectually 
‘recognized’ by states . . . Such a defi nition presumes to be resolved 
what is in fact in question: the nature and existence of the constitu-
ent power on the European level.62 
For Balibar, a constitution is not merely a form of juridical right. It
is, rather, a dynamic of social and political practices that, while never 
bypassing the formal juridical moment, spreads out immediately beyond
it, both in anticipation and application. If our task is to explain how a 
European demos might emerge, we cannot take the existence of a robust
European political identity for granted. If the demos is elusive, so too is
the supposed foundation of constitutional patriotism. Thus, if the Eu-
ropean Union is to restore the conceptual and motivational resources 
required to refashion a supranational political identity, it must look else-
where.
Following Bonnie Honig, I believe the dilemma of constitutional de-
mocracy, to which Habermas proposes constitutional patriotism as a
resolution, is ultimately imbricated in a more basic and (for our purpos-
es) more illuminating paradox. Indeed, it is this paradox that confronts
directly the motivation deficit and the question of affective politics iden-
tified above. What is needed is a change in frame, a parallax view onto
what precisely is at stake when we seek to renegotiate political identity: 
the paradox of politics. 
As Honig explains, the paradox of politics, while often referred to as
the paradox of founding, is ‘much more than that, for it is alive at every 
moment of political life and not just at the origins of a regime’.63 The
paradox marks the instability and indeterminacy of the people, as such; 
that is, the fl ux of any demos that would legislate for itself and, through 
that legislation, come to assert its existence as a coherent political com-
munity in the first place. This bind tracks closely the short circuit I 
articulated above: attachment to a demos (constitutional patriotism) re-
quires the democratic constitution of the  demos as such, which itself
presupposes the very same original attachment. Put simply: ‘In order for 
there to be a people well-formed enough for good law-making, there must
be good law for how else will the people be well-formed?’64 
62  Balibar (n 37) 161. 
63  Bonnie Honig, ‘Between Decision and Deliberation: Political Paradox in Democratic The-
ory’ (2007) 101(1) American Political Science Review 1, 3. 
64 ibid. 
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In structural terms, and relevant to our present inquiry, the paradox 
of politics is a characteristic dilemma for modern democratic politics, in
general, and for European politics, in particular, precisely because of the 
complicated immigration, migration, cultural, and political shifts within
a diverse society. Not only a question of birth and death, of coming and 
going, the paradox of politics marks the reinterpellation of citizens into 
the institutions and political cultures of a particular polity, a process not 
directly willed by those citizens themselves.65 Is this civic interpellation
not precisely what is at stake when we speak of European enlargement 
and European integration? Is this not our exact concern when we at-
tempt to articulate new supranational political identities for citizens of
European nation-states?
The paradox ‘attaches to democratic politics as such partly because 
the people are never so fully what they need to be (virtuous, democratic, 
complete) that a democracy can deny credibly that it resorts to violence, 
imposition, or coercion to maintain itself’.66 In a peculiar way, therefore,
‘the people’ are an entity simultaneously absent and present, and for 
this reason democratic politics must continually ‘call them into being,
rhetorically and materially’ while recognising that this call invariably
fails and must be repeated.67 The people as political subjects are thereby
always split, never occupying a stable political space, ‘never quite the 
cause because also always the effect of political practice’.68  Thus, the 
work of democratic politics must always already begin in media res, de-
prived of sacred points of origin (historical, cultural or legal). 
The would-be solution to this paradox is the figure of the lawgiver: 
Rousseau’s external, quasi-mythic founder who sets the law just right so
as to enable the self-government of the people. Indeed, is this not pre-
cisely the role of the European Court of Justice, the lawgiver that has
pushed the processes of integration further than Member States would 
ever have gone intergovernmentally? Does not the ECJ work to calibrate 
the material and procedural conditions just right so that, as constitu-
tional patriotism would hope, Europeans might embrace new forms of
supranational citizenship? To reiterate from above, the ECJ employed
the preliminary reference procedure and the doctrines of supremacy and 
direct effect with stunningly far-reaching consequences.69 
65 ibid. 
66  ibid 5. 
67 ibid. 
68 ibid. Here, Honig quotes a wonderful phrase from Peter Fitzpatrick. In the absent pres-
ence of the people, at the paradoxical moment of politics proper, ‘time runs widdershins 
and the present precedes itself’. Peter Fitzpatrick, Modernism and the Grounds of Law (CUP 
2001) 74. 
69 See, eg, Bruno De Witte, ‘Direct Effect, Supremacy, and the Nature of the Legal Order’ 
in P Craig & G De Burca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (OUP 1999) 209. (‘It is indisputable 
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But we must be very careful to recognise that the lawgiver is in
actuality no solution at all, that the lawgiver enables self-government of
the people only by ‘compromising their autonomy’.70 Indeed, the original
paradox of politics remains undisturbed. Even as the lawgiver founds,
the people are left with the decision whether to follow, whether to accept
the law as it has been given, or to look elsewhere. Popular sovereignty 
thus always haunts the imposition of law; the questions of legitimacy
and autonomy present themselves again and again. Was this not, in fact, 
the reaction of many constitutional courts faced with an active ECJ as-
serting expansive powers of judicial review? 
Indeed, this paradox is distinctly echoed in the heated debate con-
cerning the European ‘no demos’ thesis and is, in part, the source of
great confusion even within public law. Joseph Weiler famously criticised
the inconsistency of the German Federal Constitutional Court’s ‘Maas-
tricht decision’:71 
By endorsing the No Demos thesis [the BVerfG] accentuates the grav-
ity of the Democratic Deficit by negating any democratization power 
which the European Parliament with its present, expanded powers, 
may yield. And yet, having done so, by approving the Treaty of Maas-
tricht, it willy-nilly gave it a passing bill of democratic health.72 
The BVerfG thereby privileged and legitimated - in the defence of
democracy - what was considered for many years to be precisely the 
source of the democratic deficit, namely the intergovernmental elements
of European law.73 Per a ‘soft’ reading of the ‘no demos’ thesis, European
citizens are caught in between: while the absence of a defi ned Euro-
pean demos means that supranational institutions must not compro-
mise national democracy, European institutions nevertheless maintain
that the EEC Treaty was a treaty with some strongly innovative features, and one of them 
was the preliminary reference mechanism which allowed the ECJ courageously to articulate 
a duty for national courts which may have been (and still is) implicitly contained in other 
international treaties as well—but there is no court for saying so’.) 
70  Honig (n 63) 5. 
71 Brunner v European Union Treaty [1993] BVerfGE 89, 155 (12 October 1993), translated 
in English at [1994] 1 CMLR 57 and [1994] 33 ILM 388. 
72  JHH Weiler, ‘Does Europe Need a Constitution? Reflections on Demos, Telos and the 
German Maastricht Decision’ (1995) 1 European Law Journal 219-58. See also JHH Weiler, 
‘The State “über alles”: Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht Decision’ (1995) Jean 
Monnet Center for International and Regional Economic Law & Justice, Jean Monnet Work-
ing Paper No 6/95. 
73  Alec Stone Sweet notes the deep irony, as well, writing: ‘Had the rules the German Court 
laid down [in the decision] been enforceable since the beginning, the construction of an EC 
charter of rights—which the BVerfG itself required in the name of democracy, but which 
were not a product of an intergovernmental bargain—would clearly have been unconstitu-
tional.” Sweet, The Judicial Construction of Europe (n 19) 94. 
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increasing power over the lives of citizens, in precisely the name of a new 
supranational civic body that holds itself as an ideal for democratisation 
and universal human rights. The articulation of the ‘no demos’ thesis is 
thus itself a marker for the fundamental and indeterminate split of the 
demos, as such. Europe and its courts seem to be caught, as much as
its citizens, in a liminal space, unable either to define or to grasp ‘the
people’ to which they nevertheless must always refer. 
But must we consider this liminal space a political trap and with-
draw to the familiarity of old nationalisms? Instead, we might view, as
does Honig, the failure of the lawgiver another way, as only a begin-
ning, an inauguration of contestatory politics. The conceptual shift here 
is from the juridical founding of Europe to the ultimately political act of
its ‘constitution’ by an indeterminate constituent power. It is a shift from
constitutional patriotism to cosmopolitical agonism. The law, insofar as
it is given, insofar as it solicits the people, never fully captures them in
their totality. They are always a unity and a multitude. The law thus 
produces ‘remnants’ and varying interpretations that must be reconciled
through politics, through a productive process of democratic contesta-
tion. As Honig writes: 
The paradox of politics . . . calls attention to law’s formative powers, 
its never fully willed role in processes of subject-formation, and the 
need, therefore, in a democracy, periodically and regularly to subject 
law to democratization by way of amendment, augmentation, or nul-
lifi cation.74 
It is this that should animate the vision of European integration and
enlargement: an affi rmative embrace of the undecidability of the people, 
a recognition of law as a beginning for politics, and an agonistic democ-
ratisation of the law itself. In its generative force, the law continually pro-
duces remnants (alternate interpretations, excluded views and groups,
particulars escaping the reach of the universal, etc) that, precisely be-
cause they are not captured by the law, inaugurate politics proper. In the 
end, the paradox of politics
points to alternative domains of political work by depriving us of 
postulated points of origin . . . and inviting us to see [how] law and 
its authors/subjects fundamentally fail to intersect in the present in 
ways that satisfy independent standards of legitimation.75 
Here, we might note with Balibar that the promise of European citi-
zenship resides not in the ‘passive enjoyment of formal rights’ but in
the fact that ‘European citizens themselves produce, by removing the
74  Honig (n 63) 8. 
75  ibid 15. 
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existing obstacles, the conditions of a new belonging - and no doubt,
inevitably, the conditions of a nonexclusive belonging in a new sense of
the word’.76 Only in this dynamic sense is the full measure of European
citizenship and supranational identity thinkable. In the end, the political 
identity of a demos is intricately tied to its own inner dynamic of inclu-
sion and exclusion, to coming to terms with its own ‘remnants’, and to 
the political negotiation of the defined border it might draw.77 It is to this
dynamic that I now turn. 
4. Beyond inclusion and exclusion: heterogeneity as European 
cosmopolitics 
The indeterminacy of the demos, the idea that the self-legislating
and sovereign ‘people’ is always constitutively split, frames the question
of political identity as one of contingency and of necessary exclusion, 
the creation of differential ‘remainders’. That is, the identity of the peo-
ple and their self-presence in the world become a contingent negotiation 
of the lines of exclusion/inclusion that mark and determine, however 
unstably, the polity’s boundaries. Indeed, in order for the demos to be 
democratic and civic, as opposed to simply ethnic in strongly essential-
ist terms, it must internalise this negotiation as part of its own identity. 
It must ‘occupy’ the space of indeterminacy. My thesis here is that the
European identity - in order to emerge in contradistinction to nationalist 
particularism while at the same time rejecting an empty and unmoti-
vated universalism - faces precisely this task. Located strictly within the 
paradox of politics, this task cannot be fulfi lled with constitutionalism
alone. Rather, law requires a democratic supplement, and indeed this is 
why Europe’s current democratic deficit presents such a fundamental 
problem and why constitutional patriotism has failed to take broader 
hold within the European political consciousness. Nevertheless, to push 
the critique further, this democratic supplement must take a particular
form: not simply expanding the margins of inclusion but articulating a 
new agonism that would think differently about boundaries themselves.
Through this renewed contestatory politics, European identity would 
find productive ways to reclaim a future on behalf of the Other, on behalf
of those whom European identity necessarily excludes in the present so
that it may exist in the first place. In this sense, European political iden-
tity would adopt a distinctly ethical and cosmopolitan dimension: a re-
thinking of the very idea of integration, of the negotiation of the included
76  Balibar (n 37) 162. 
77  As Balibar writes, ‘We are not ‘citizens’, but we can ‘become’ citizens; we can enter into
one or several processes of creation of citizenship. And we enter all the more deeply into 
them the numerous and more different (I would almost say the more divergent) we are’. ibid 
199. 
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and excluded, of inside and outside.78 It is only this kind of democracy
that can be called cosmopolitan and, in the end, European. 
When Étienne Balibar delivered his lecture, ‘At the Borders of Eu-
rope’, in 1999 in Thessaloniki, Greece, he began by noting Greece’s place 
as ‘one of the “peripheral” countries of Europe in its traditional confi gu-
ration’.79 For Balibar, Greece captured both the metaphor and the reality 
of the border: a place where the ‘dialectic between confrontation with
the foreigner (transformed into a hereditary enemy) and communication 
between civilizations (without which humanity cannot progress) is peri-
odically played out’.80 At this border, within and across peripheral zones,
the confrontation of difference (whether cultural or economic) constitutes 
the ‘melting pot for the formation of a people (demos), without which 
there is no citizenship (politeia)’.81 Indeed, as this section will attempt to 
show, the periphery inverts in Derridean fashion to become the centre 
in the constitution of a European cosmopolitan identity. Balibar writes
with words that ring even truer and more imperative today: ‘If Europe is 
for us first of all the name of an unresolved political problem, Greece is 
one of its centers, not because of the mythical origins of our civilization . 
. . but because of the current problems concentrated there’.82 If we indeed
take Europe, as an ideal, to represent an unresolved question of politics
and of political identity, Greece and all border regions become essential 
to formulating what is at stake: the posited transformation of civic iden-
tity through juridification, economic determinism, as well as the entry of
the Other - immigrants, asylum seekers, citizens of accession countries 
- into the European political community. The reason why the liminal 
spaces of Europe become drivers of a pan-national European identity lies
in the contradictory construction of the people and the confl icts through 
which such contradictions are navigated, if not resolved. If there really
is an ‘emergent’ European people, then it is to be found at the border of
belonging and exclusion, in the very negotiation of identity claims. In
other words, the border, more than any other place (both physical and 
conceptual), makes visible the people’s indeterminacy, their constitutive
split in its distilled, pure form. Greece is (or, rather, has the potential to 
be) contemporary Europe’s ‘Philadelphia’ of 1776 or ‘Paris’ of 1789 - the 
particular democratic supplement to pan-European constitutional legal-
ism. 
78  See, eg, Gerard Delanty, ‘The Idea of a Cosmopolitan Europe: On the Cultural Signifi -
cance of Europeanization’ (2005) 15(3) Intl Rev of Sociology 405, 416. (‘[S]trengthening de-
mocracy alone will not create a cosmopolitanism’.) 
79  Balibar (n 37) 1. 
80 ibid. 
81  ibid 1-2. 
82  ibid 2. 
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Let me clarify in greater detail why this might be the case. Each of
the terms thus far invoked - indeterminacy, undecidability, instability,
constitutive split, differential remainder - ultimately refers to the impos-
sibility of representing the self-identity of the demos. These claims about 
the tensions within political identity, and therefore about its contingent
construction, emerge from the tradition of Ernesto Laclau’s radical de-
mocracy and his concepts of hegemony and heterogeneity. Together, radi-
cal democracy, hegemony and heterogeneity provide a productive ana-
lytic frame for understanding the task of European supranational cos-
mopolitanism and of its political practice. 
For Laclau, the construction of common political identity functions
only through the practice of ‘hegemony’, by which differences across par-
ticularities are rearticulated into a unity.83 This unity rests on no essen-
tialism; it is instead a contingent articulation, the result of political engage-
ment. ‘Hegemony is always achieved, never given’.84 Moreover, hegemonic
unity is communicated necessarily by a particular ‘representative,’ a part
nested within the community itself. This would mean, moreover, that the
identity of the communal whole must be in the end unstable: it remains
the case that the representative part is particular and thereby retains its
difference from each other particular element even while standing in for
the whole. This instability can be avoided only if the representative is able
to empty itself of all differential content, taking the form of an empty signi-
fi er.85 The empty signifier - ‘freedom’ or ‘democracy’, for example - stands in
for the communal whole in such a way that no other particular difference
competes with it. In other words, the empty signifi er interrupts difference,
establishing a chain of equivalence across particularities. The representa-
tive is thereby able to establish hegemonic unity and determine the clear,
antagonistic lines of division constitutive of the community’s fullness: the
knowledge of who falls within and who falls without, who is for freedom
and against it, who is democratic and who is not.86 
However, here the difficulty becomes the following: the representa-
tive’s synecdochic gesture can never entirely succeed because the repre-
sentative is never able to empty itself fully of differential content. There is
always a ‘differential remainder’ of particularity.87 The act of representa-
83  See generally Ernesto Laclau, Emancipation(s) (Verso 1996) chapter 3. 
84  Ernesto Laclau, ‘Why Constructing a People is the Main Task of Radical Politics’ (2006) 
32 Critical Inquiry 646, 672. 
85 Laclau, Emancipation(s) (n 83) chapter 2. 
86  For an excellent summary of this position, see generally Lasse Thomassen, ‘In/exclu-
sions: Towards a Radical Democratic Approach to Exclusion’ in L Tonder & L Thomassen 
(eds), Radical Democracy: Politics between Lack and Abundance (Manchester UP 2005). 
87 See Ernesto Laclau, ‘On the Names of God,’ in Sue Golding (ed), The Eight Technologies 
of Otherness (Routledge 1997). 
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tion takes place in a field already structured by relations of power and 
exclusion and thus this act must always establish itself at the expense of
other particularities. This exclusion may not be evident right away, but 
the chain of equivalence eventually unravels when it becomes clear that
the empty signifier is actually not that empty at all, when ‘freedom’ of the
community as a whole in practice means the freedom of some at the ex-
pense of the freedom of others. In other words, the empty universal can 
only ever occupy a ‘place’ of fullness and never give that place content.
Further, the differential remainder betrays a constitutive split in the
communal identity as produced by hegemonic articulation. The commu-
nity is always internally divided; its limits are unclear; its borders are in
flux. Here, the precise distinction between inclusion and exclusion gives 
way.88 There remains an irreducible gap between hegemony and identity
itself - that is, between the temporary ‘fullness’ articulated by the empty 
signifier and the universal self-correspondence of the community. The 
basic notion here, going back to Hegel, is that universality is never purely
universal; it is never truly context-transcending and free of particularity.
Universalism can only emerge out of particularity, out of an inscribed
event already marked by particular exclusions. As Laclau writes, ‘Uni-
versality is incommensurable with any particularity but cannot, how-
ever, exist apart from the particular’.89 This mutual relation between the 
particular and the universal, between the part and the whole, creates a 
perpetual gap dividing hegemonic articulation and the universal (closed)
communal identity. This gap, therefore, must always be renegotiated  
and rearticulated politically: ‘The recognition of the constitutive nature 
of this gap and its political institutionalization is the starting point for 
modern democracy’.90 I hope to show that it ought to be the starting point
for a reappraisal of European cosmopolitan politics, as well. 
The term for this residual particularism, the gap that is a condition 
of (im)possibility for the process of hegemony, is heterogeneity. Heteroge-
neity is the differential remainder that must be continuously suppressed
in order for the hegemonic articulation to survive in its current terms.
Yet, without heterogeneity, the equivalence made across differences and 
the logic of division would be impossible. The exclusion of the heteroge-
neous enables us, in the first place, to speak of an inside and outside.
In the very process or moment of suppression, identity and difference 
emerge as sensible. Thus, heterogeneity refers to that which eludes yet 
constitutes the logic of inclusion and exclusion.91  It bestrides the very
88 See Thomassen (n 86) 107. 
89 Laclau, Emancipation(s) (n 83) 34. 
90  ibid 46. 
91  Thomassen offers a clear example of such heterogeneity: the figure of the Lumpenpro-
letariat in Marx. ‘The Lumpenproletariat is a discursive excess, escaping the conceptual 
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limits of political identity. This is why the heterogeneous element is so
critical to our inquiry: its continued presence lifts the veil on the wid-
er issue of political belonging, on the whole question of the logics that
structure the social and political whole as whole.92 Heterogeneity is the
symptom of a much broader and deeper phenomenon of exclusion. 
Focusing on such discursive remainders, the loci of heterogeneity,
thereby enables us to criticise from within the existing marginal deter-
minations of identity. By destabilising the division itself, heterogeneity 
disrupts previously settled sites of communal identity. Put simply, het-
erogeneity is the marker of contingency; it is evidence for the fact that a
particularly constructed identity, with its limits and delineations, could 
be otherwise. For this reason, the work of heterogeneity is the cosmopoli-
tan political operation par excellence.93 Indeed, if our ideal of European
cosmopolitanism demands the disruption of closed national identities
and the development of new forms of belonging and corresponding le-
gal structures, then Europe’s heterogeneous elements provide a promis-
ing analytic and symbolic starting point. Heterogeneity enables us to 
work beyond the abstract hollowness of current pan-European ideals, to 
fill these empty signifiers with concrete meaning embedded in concrete 
struggles. Moreover, heterogeneity confronts directly the current borders 
of exclusion lining the European political space.94 
In this sense, the heterogeneous frame centres a particular vision
of cosmopolitanism itself; namely, cosmopolitanism conceived not as a
European (or, for that matter, global) super-state, merely re-inscribing 
the exclusionary logics of the nation-state on a larger scale. Instead of
attempting to overcome exclusion through an a priori ‘universally’ in-
clusive state, heterogeneity demands a new form of cosmopolitics that
reconsiders which exclusions are made, how, and by whom. This Euro-
categories of the analysis of capitalism. It is heterogeneous to these categories, a discursive 
remainder from the determination of the antagonistic relation between the proletariat and 
the capitalist class. However . . . the Lumpenproletariat not only shows the limit of the at-
tempt to objectify the relation between proletariat and capitalists; it is the exclusion of the 
Lumpenproletariat from the other conceptual categories that makes Marx able to theorise 
the latter as determined by their antagonistic opposition’. Thomassen (n 86) 113. 
92 See Laclau, ‘Why Constructing a People is the Main Task of Radical Politics’ (n 84) 667. 
93  Heterogeneity exemplifies a particularly ethical vision for the cosmopolitan project. It 
is an orientation and frame of mind towards politics fitting with the following refl ection by 
Edward Said: ‘I occasionally experience myself as a cluster of fl owing currents. I prefer this 
to the idea of a solid self, the identity to which so many attach so much signifi cance. These 
currents, like the themes of one’s own life, flow along during the waking hours, and at their 
best, they require no reconciling, no harmonizing. They are “off” and maybe out of place, 
but at least they are always in motion, in time, in place, in the form of all kinds of strange 
combinations moving about, not necessarily forward, sometimes against each other, con-
trapunctally yet without one central theme’. Edward Said, Out of Place (Granta 1999) 295. 
94  See Balibar (n 37) 9. 
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pean cosmopolitics would understand exclusions to be necessary but 
contingent, and thereby always already open to contestation. 
Furthermore, because the inclusion of some relies on the suppres-
sion and exclusion of others, cosmopolitics as heterogeneity must ques-
tion the dominant models of inclusion, as well. As Lasse Thomassen 
writes, ‘If exclusion is constitutive of inclusion, then inclusion cannot
simply proceed as the extension of symmetrical relations to a point where 
we reach universal inclusion’.95 Instead, we must find new ways to under-
stand and relate to those who are, at the moment, excluded. In this vein, 
Thomassen expresses concern with Robert Goodin’s call for the expan-
sion of institutional frameworks to accommodate belonging beyond the
nation-state: ‘a system of multiple, overlapping “sovereignties”, with lots
of different levels and places one might lodge an application or an ap-
peal’, as well as other institutions to care for those still falling outside the 
reach of these ‘sovereignties’.96 Is this not, by the way, almost identical to
the constitutional pluralist model envisioned by some for the European
continent, a mélange of national constitutional courts operating in over-
lapping and interpenetrating universes with the European Court of Jus-
tice and the European Court of Human Rights, offering a variety of fora
in which to lodge appeals?97 While Goodin recognises the constitutive
exclusion at work here, the problem is that those offered residual inclu-
sion remain marginal and thus nearly as excluded as before.98 Precisely 
because of the intertwined nature of inclusion/exclusion and the blur-
ring of boundaries, those who remain (who fall outside the reach of these 
95  ibid 115. 
96  Robert Goodin, ‘Inclusion and Exclusion’ (1996) 37 Archives Européenes de Sociologie 
364. 
97 See Neil Walker, ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’ (2002) 65 Modern Law Review 
317; see also Neil MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State and Nation in the Eu-
ropean Commonwealth (OUP 1999) 117 (constitutional pluralism entails that ‘[t]he legal 
systems of member-states and their common legal system of EC law are distinct but inter-
acting systems of law, and hierarchical relationships of validity within criteria of validity 
proper to distinct systems do not add up to any sort of all-purpose superiority of one system 
over the other’.); Mattias Kumm, ‘Who is the Final Arbiter of Constitutionality in Europe?: 
Three Conceptions of the Relationship between the German Federal Constitutional Court 
and the European Court of Justice’ (1999) 36 Common Market Law Review 351; Mattias 
Kumm, ‘The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict: Constitutional Supremacy in Europe 
Before and After the Constitutional Treaty’ (2005) 11 European Law Journal 262; Miguel 
Poiares Maduro, ‘Contrapunctual Law: Europe’s Constitutional Pluralism in Action’ in Neil 
Walker (ed), Sovereignty in Transition (Hart Publishing 2003) 501; Miguel Poiares Maduro, 
‘Interpreting European Law: Judicial Adjudication in a Context of Constitutional Plural-
ism’ (2007) 1 European Journal of Legal Studies 1; Julio Baquero Cruz, ‘The Legacy of 
the Maastricht-Urteil and the Pluralist Movement’ (2008) 14 European Law Journal 389; 
Armin von Bogdandy, ‘Pluralism, Direct Effect, and the Ultimate Say: On the Relationship 
Between International and Domestic Constitutional Law’ (2008) 6 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 397. 
98 See Thomassen (n 86) 116. 
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multiplying institutions) will be scattered in all forms of liminal spaces
inside and outside, relegated to marginal positions as residual. At work
here seems to be a comfortable gradualism quite unable or reluctant to 
engage more critically the dominant logic of inclusion itself. 
To the appraisal of Goodin’s framework should be added similar 
enthusiasms for embracing the productive cosmopolitan capacity of so-
called ‘disaggregated citizenship’ currently at work to varying degrees 
in the European Union.99 Seyla Benhabib has noted with approval the
granting of privileges of political citizenship to residing EU citizens ir-
respective of particular European nationality: namely, the rights to vote
and stand for office in local elections, as well as more substantial socio-
economic rights for longer-term residents.100 Benhabib recognises that
the situation is much less agreeable for third-country nationals, who do
not have the benefit of these political rights, yet points to (apparently 
unidirectional, linear) changes in Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and Hol-
land, where even third-country nationals can participate in local elec-
tions.101 She nevertheless asserts, ‘The most important conclusion to be
drawn from these developments is that the entitlement to rights is no
longer dependent on the status of citizenship’.102 While democratic cos-
mopolitics might see the promise of such moves of inclusion, we might 
also be more careful to note the hidden exclusions and marginalisations 
on which these inclusions depend. This is especially true in the case of
third-country nationals and the provision of social rights, a situation we 
currently see deteriorating in times of deep economic recession.103 
Thus, while Benhabib might view the continued inner exclusion of
immigrants as a postscript to be resolved through time and through 
further democratic iterations of constitutional rights, we might disagree. 
Instead, we might assert with Balibar that ‘this question of the interior
exclusion of “immigrants” constitutes a genuine test of truth for the na-
tion-form and for the “community of citizens” to which it gives a name’.104 
We might point to the ‘gaps [that emerge] in the content of European
rights, official practices that diverge significantly from formal legal obli-
gations, and the limited extent to which individuals try to exercise these 
rights that transgress traditional boundaries between national societ-
99  See, eg, Jean Cohen, ‘Changing Paradigms of Citizenship and the Exclusiveness of the 
Demos’ (1999) 14(3) International Sociology 245. 
100 Benhabib, Another Cosmopolitanism (n 49) 46. 
101 ibid. 
102 ibid. 
103  See, eg, Lisa Conant, ‘Contested Boundaries: Citizens, States, and Supranational Be-
longing in the European Union’ (2001) Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Eu-
ropean Forum Series, RSC No 2001/21. 
104  Balibar (n 37) 61. 
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ies’.105 Here, the question becomes whether such interior exclusion, far 
from being a sphere yet to be included, is rather a symptom of the very
programme of inclusion - namely of its legalistic character - to which we 
are currently committed.106 
Indeed, even the most recent appeal by Jürgen Habermas for a 
shared sovereignty between European nation-states and supranational 
institutions threatens the creation of new gaps in which citizenship and 
rights fail to accrue.107 In these gaps, individuals become once again ex-
posed without the protection of a political community. It is in precisely 
these spaces that the heterogeneous element is made visible, as such. Is 
this not what happened to the Greek voter, for example, whose voice was 
all but silenced (despite all forms of political and civic rights) before the 
decision of the EU organs and Council of Ministers to push forward the 
conditioned bailout of the Eurozone?108 
The relevant point here and in response to Goodin is that, if we as
Europeans are to be responsible to the call of cosmopolitics, we must ori-
ent ourselves to the concrete practices of marginalisation that occur even 
within moves towards greater formal inclusion under the law. Even here, 
new boundaries and limits are redrawn, sometimes re-emphasised. In
this sense, cosmopolitics is an orientation to marginalisation in the pre-
cise meaning of the term, occurring at the margins, in the liminal spaces
that never fail to reassert themselves. Because heterogeneity orients us 
both to the contingency behind current states of affairs and power ar-
rangements, as well as to the boundaries of the political community 
itself, a cosmopolitics of heterogeneity prompts us to rethink altogether 
the ways in which our communities constitute themselves.109 
105  Conant (n 103) 1. 
106  Balibar has conceived this inner relationship as one between (a) the development of the 
European Union and its search for a political identity and (b) the creation of a new Euro-
pean ‘apartheid’, in which new groups of immigrants and poor of various nationalities are 
excluded and discriminated against within the borders of Europe. Balibar (n 37) 31-50. 
107 See Habermas, On Europe’s Constitution (n 22). 
108  See, eg, ‘One Step Closer to Nowhere’ To Ethnos (Athens 13 February 2012) <http:// 
www.presseurop.eu/en/content/article/1506381-one-step-closer-nowhere>; Frank Shirr-
mac her, ‘Democracy Has Junk Status’ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Frankfurt am Main 
2 November 2011) <http://www.presseurop.eu/en/content/article/1128541-democra-
cy-has-junk-status>; Giorgos Malouhous, ‘Greece Retires…’ To Vima (Athens 9 February 
2012) <http://www.presseurop.eu/en/content/article/1495071-greece-retires>; Rainer 
Hank, ‘Greece, the Serf of Europe’ Frankfurter Algemeine Sonntagszeitung (Frankfurt am 
Main 17 June 2011) <http://www.presseurop.eu/en/content/article/719681-greece-serf-
europe>; Amartya Sen, ‘Let’s Wrest Democracy Back’ The Guardian (London 24 June 2011) 
<http://www.presseurop.eu/en/content/article/737641-amartya-sen-lets-wrest-democ-
racy-back> all accessed 10 June 2012. 
109 See Thomassen (n 86) 116. 
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In this regard, the rethinking of boundaries remains sceptical of
our ability to ever abolish exclusion, indeed, remaining mindful of the 
exclusion that conditions any inclusive endeavour. Cosmopolitics there-
by attempts to walk a fine line, rejecting the false choice often posed to 
us. As Bonnie Honig eloquently puts it: 
The challenge is to open up room for the much-needed double ges-
ture: for example, to oppose the constitutionalization of the EU in 
the name of an alternative locatable and accountable rule of law, to 
counter that future with another in the name of the very democratic 
and human rights that constitutionalization has historically claimed 
to entrench, and to do all this without being cast as a mere agonist, 
or a defender of national particularity, or as a member of the Na-
tional Front, as if these were the only options.110 
This conceptual middle again finds its expression in the limit situ-
ations in which the foreigner must be brought within the public sphere 
of participation. Since heterogeneity always structures the community’s 
capacity to define itself coherently, the heterogeneous element’s traversal 
of the communal boundary presents the purest opportunity for the pol-
ity’s cosmopolitical self-appraisal, for it to destabilise and thereby para-
doxically reconstitute its ‘common’ identity. It is at this moment that the 
community as such is self-present, that it intersects - fleetingly - with
the universal.
This point is nicely captured by Jacques Rancière’s analysis of the
‘part with no part’: a body included as a subset of the community only
insofar as its existence is suppressed so that the dominant identity-for-
mation can proceed through hegemonic power.111 In Disagreement, Ran-
cière argues that politics - in contradistinction to mere administration, 
domination, or police - exists ‘when the natural order of domination is 
interrupted by the institution of a part of those who have no part. This 
institution is the whole of politics as a specific form of connection. It de-
fines the common of the community as a political community’.112 It is,
in short, the assertion of equality amidst a field of inequality. Thus, the 
properly political act - that is, the act that founds the community as a 
political entity - does not merely extend the status of victim to the ex-
cluded or include them as marginal figures within still new structures of
110  Bonnie Honig, ‘Another Cosmopolitanism? Law and Politics in the New Europe’ in Rob-
ert Post (ed), Another Cosmopolitanism (n 50) 114. 
111  Critical to this concept is a revival of Hannah Arendt’s assertion that the refugee is the 
paradigm for conceptualising politics and the contemporary state. See Hannah Arendt, ‘We 
Refugees’ (1943) 31(1) Menorah J; see also Giorgio Agamben, ‘We Refugees’ (1995) 49(2) 
Symposium 114. 
112  Jacques Rancière, Disagreement Politics and Philosophy (Julie Rose tr, University of 
Minnesota Press 1999) 12. 
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subordination. Rather, the political act reconstitutes the community as
a whole, the community’s universal quality, by ‘making “a part of those 
who have no part,” or by giving an unconditional right to the discourse 
of equality whose bearers they are historically’.113 
I would therefore suggest that the constitutive European political act 
occurs through subjectification in the course of including the part with
no part; in the giving of priority to the political rights and political strug-
gles of the marginalised part at the boundary of inclusion and exclusion. 
This political subjectification, in which individuals begin to see them-
selves as citizens constituting a new political body, is the element absent
from Europeanisation through European Union law. Because subjectifi -
cation occurs within or in reaction to the spaces of heterogeneity, the law
- insofar as it must unify heterogeneous cases under classifi cation and
doctrine - obscures precisely these sites of meaning-creation.114 Thus, in
elaborating (with Laclau) a radical democratic conception of European
identity, we must begin not with a positive constitutional law but with
the site of the ‘wrong’ itself, the site of marginalisation. The political 
subjectifi cation of European citizens occurs in the shared act of making
this wrong right.115 
Therefore, if Europe is to continue as a supranational and cosmo-
politan project while at the same time remaining democratic and legiti-
mate as a political community, its constitutive founding moment lies in
the ‘confrontation with the different modalities of exclusion’.116 It is here 
that European citizenship might (for nothing is guaranteed) be born. The 
shared act requires dominant and subaltern groups to be brought togeth-
er, to participate in the same political struggles.117 The critical point here 
is that - by privileging cross-cutting participation in political struggle
and therefore recognising excluded groups as active citizens even before
113  Balibar (n 37) 72. 
114  In collapsing distinctions and creating new equivalences, law suppresses heterogeneous 
elements as heterogeneous. This process functions with simple naming of the Other (‘im-
migrant’ or ‘migrant’ or ‘third-country national’), in terms dictated by dominant discourses, 
or it works in the more complex objectification through the discourse of rights that codify 
different existing modalities of subordination. See, eg, Wendy Brown, States of Injury: Power 
and Freedom in Late Modernity (Princeton UP 1995). Moreover, in the EU context, this is 
also why economic integration is particularly ill-suited for the task of crossing-boundaries 
while preserving heterogeneity: insofar as economics asserts equivalence across previously 
closed social sites, it falls into the same short circuit of abstraction as does law. 
115  See Balibar (n 37) 74-5. 
116  ibid 76. 
117  For this, of course, appeal to abstract principles and rights must be supplemented by 
strong appeals to passion and to sentiment. Nevertheless, these concrete political struggles, 
in addition to being the ‘moments of truth’ for political identity, are also the testing and 
proving grounds for the motivational participatory identities that ultimately sustain demo-
cratic life. See below section 2. 
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they are granted formal rights to citizenship - the chain of transnational 
cosmopolitics is brought into being through anticipation.118 
As we shall see, this concept of heterogeneity allows us to intervene 
in current debates about European immigration, asylum, and national-
ity. It allows us to see them as sites for the creation of a cosmopolitan
European political identity, as the refugee becomes the subject of Euro-
pean politics proper. 
5. The refugee as citizen: migration and nationality in the new 
Europe 
The processes of EU enlargement and internal integration have re-
cast the borders of the continent. The polemicised Fortress Europe and 
its treatment of asylum seekers and refugees parallels the internal divi-
sions within the Union and the new social exclusion of ‘internal refu-
gees’. The concern here is thus double: the right of entry into the Union, 
understood as an ethically significant act of hospitality,119 as well as the
internal struggle for political and social rights by marginalised groups,
understood as the struggle for equality against structures of subordi-
nation and domination. The sites of division recur both at the external
borders of Europe, as well as in new places altogether - within cities
(centre/peripheral suburbs); across religious communities (secular/Mus-
lim/Jew/Catholic); and across regions (with depressed/advanced rates of
economic growth). Whatever the site, however, each of these coalesces
around the exemplary figure of the migrant-refugee, the model for how 
we might conceive citizenship if we are to build a polity beyond the logics
of inclusion and exclusion. 
As mentioned above, the focus on the refugee prompts an important 
change of analytic frame that enables us to see the reach of a new Euro-
pean sovereignty to be democratised. While sovereignty has transformed 
its relationship to hospitality, this shift is not in itself defi nitively posi-
tive. As Honig is careful to emphasise, ‘new openness . . . can just as well
be a sign of sovereignty’s adjustments, accommodations, and relocations’
from traditional and visible locales to those new and less visible.120 
118 See Étienne Balibar, ‘At the Borders of Citizenship: A Democracy in Translation?’ (2010)
13(3) European Journal of Social Theory 315, 320. 
119  See Jacques Derrida, Of Hospitality (Rachel Bowlby tr, Stanford UP 2000). Derrida 
argues that to ask the question of Europe is to bring to mind and to cultivate a culture of 
hospitality, an ethos of belonging, and—in the end—an ethics. Derrida writes, ‘[I]nasmuch 
as it is a manner of being there, the manner in which we relate to ourselves and to others, to 
others as our own or as foreigners, ethics is hospitality; ethics is so thoroughly coextensive 
with the experience of hospitality’, ibid 123-5. 
120  Honig, ‘Another Cosmopolitanism?’ (n 110) 114. 
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The question thus becomes the following: ‘What if refugees, rather 
than (or in addition to) being the exceptions of the juridical state (or 
continental) system, are metaphorically its norm, the exemplary objects 
of the sort of power that the state system and its sovereign legalism rep-
resent but hide?’121 I want to take this point even further. As I will sug-
gest, refugees are not only the exemplary objects of the new European
sovereignty but also the exemplary subjects of a new European politics, 
perhaps precisely because of their liminal status. The figure of the mi-
grant-refugee - those both excluded from and within Europe - is direct-
ly implicated in the processes whereby Europeans, those that consider 
themselves included in the polity (or polities) of Europe, might regain
their own citizenship, might become citizens themselves. 
Here, I want to stress the confluence of the preceding abstract con-
siderations of citizenship (universality/particularity, the indeterminacy 
of ‘the people’, sovereignty, constitutionalisation) and the more concrete 
matters of residency permits, short-term and long-term visas, issues of
family reunifi cation, and so on. Again, if we consider citizenship’s evolu-
tion into the sphere of the supranational to be critical for the existence
of a truly democratic Europe, then the status of ‘the foreigner’ or ‘the
immigrant’ within the European political space is intimately bound up
with the democratic freedoms of all other European citizens. Indeed,
the inclusion of the Other in this sense overlaps with the successful
traversal of citizenship from a merely national affair to a concept with
supranational meaning and import.
The obstacle such a traversal faces is the clear asymmetry of the 
immigrant worker or the refugee before the ‘native’ society, into which he
nevertheless might be considered ‘integrated’. The immigrant as non-na-
tional is extended the formal protections of all sorts of juridical rights, yet
is nevertheless kept in a ‘status of legal tutelage’.122 He receives the tools
for assimilation, even successful assimilation, yet the process whereby 
he may become ‘one of us’ is ‘only on the condition of respecting the 
terms of a “contract” whose terms he can never negotiate for himself’.123 
This form of conditional hospitality a priori structures the encoun-
ter in the native host’s favour. As Jacques Derrida writes, the stranger 
‘must ask for hospitality in a language which by definition is not his 
own, the one imposed on him by the master of the house, the host, the 
king, the lord, the authorities’.124 As we shall see, this is captured in the 
121  ibid 115. 
122 Balibar, We, the People of Europe? (n 37) 40. 
123 ibid. 
124  Derrida (n 119) 15. 
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legal language through which the right to asylum, its adjudication, and 
its policing are governed. As such, limited hospitality is predicated on
the preservation of a boundary, not its transcendence or reappraisal. 
Nevertheless, this hierarchy is precisely also an opportunity, insofar as
the gap between the national and non-national makes visible the con-
tingency of all other discriminatory social relations within a particular
polity. It is within and in response to this gap that a supranational citi-
zenship might emerge.
Let us briefly outline how such a gap appears in the context of Eu-
ropean citizenship before considering the issues of immigration and asy-
lum. The Treaty of Maastricht directly extended European citizenship 
only to nationals of existing European Union Member States and thus 
plainly excluded from political citizenship the many people coming in
from non-European countries (namely the immigrants from places like
Turkey, India, Algeria, Morocco, and China), regardless of their cultural
or economic integration within European society.125 For nationals of non-
Member States, their access to political rights remains entrenched in
their extra-European cultural and national origins. Thus, the facially
progressive move to decouple political citizenship in the European Union 
- the rights to vote in local elections or to petition European tribunals 
- from national belonging introduces a new form of discriminatory exclu-
sion previously unknown in the nation-state.126 Now, the foreigner is no
longer a bearer of rights under another, reciprocal national sovereign;
he is instead a lesser citizen within the boundary of a new (additional)
supranational order. He is the object of internal exclusion. Balibar puts
this in razor sharp terms: the third-country nationals,
installed for one or several generations on the soil of the various Eu-
ropean countries, and who as a whole have become indispensable 
to European well-being, culture, and civility, become a mass of sec-
ond-class citizens or subject residents ‘at the service’ of Europeans 
by full right, even when they enjoy long-term or permanent rights of 
residency.127 
The imposition of this seemingly permanent hierarchy produces the 
symptomatic outcome of framing new forms of discrimination within Eu-
ropean society, around which nationalist sentiments of racist xenopho-
bia can accrue. It is no surprise then that political discourse in Europe, 
especially preceding national elections, tends to incorporate strong anti-
125  Consolidated TEU (n 33) art. 9 (‘Every national of a Member State shall be a citizen of 
the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to national citizenship and shall not 
replace it’). 
126 See Balibar, We, the People of Europe? (n 37) 44. 
127 ibid. 
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immigrant rhetoric and vague talk of repressing illegal immigration.128 
The cynical paradox should be noted, too, as third-country nationals are 
excluded from full political participation in their communities yet very
readily included in the economic systems in which quality of life and sal-
ary level differences can still be exploited.
The main point here is that, even when read most sympathetically,
the European Union is the site of a double, divergent movement in which 
(a) formal rights of European citizenship are gradually extended to in-
clude certain classes of third-country nationals in the European legal 
order, while (b) Member State governments constrict national citizenship 
policies in order to limit access to those same EU citizenship rights.129 
The European Court of Justice has sharpened its position, all but termi-
nating national linkage under EU law and extending equal rights to all 
EU residents,130 as well as developing a complex line of cases on equal 
128  Take, for example, the recent remarks by French President Nicolas Sarkozy on his in-
tentions to end illegal immigration, to the point of possibly dismantling the Schengen space 
itself. See ‘Sarkozy Threatens to Withdraw from Schengen Accord’ BBC News (London 11 
March 2012) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-17332458> accessed 10 June 2012. 
This is not to mention the continuous anti-immigrant rhetoric of LePen’s National Front, or 
the recent controversy surrounding the Dutch People’s Party (PVV) website urging citizens 
to submit complaints about migrant workers from Central and Eastern Europe. That such 
discriminatory attitudes have taken hold in what are traditionally seen as the most progres-
sive of European states should give us pause. Further, we should look at the handful of 
countries (France, Netherlands, Italy, Belgium, and others) that have already banned or are 
entertaining proposals to ban the wearing of the burqa in public. See, eg, Loi No. 2010-1192 
interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l’espace public [Law Forbidding the Conceal-
ment of the Face in the Public Space] of 11 October 2010, Journal Officiel de la République 
Française [JO] [Official Gazette of France] (12 October 2010) 18344; Loi visant à interdire le 
port de tout vêtement cachant totalement ou de manière principale le visage [Law Forbid-
ding the Wearing of Face-Concealing Clothing] of 1 June 2011, Moniteur Belge [MB] [Offi cial 
Gazette of Belgium] (13 July 2011) 41734. 
129  See, eg, Case 200/02 Kinqian Catherine Zhu and Man Lavette Chen v Sec’y of State for 
the Home Dept [2004] ECR I-09925 (extending EU citizenship rights, namely the right of 
residence, to the parents of a child born in Ireland and thus attaining Irish citizenship). 
This case is particularly exemplary of the divergence in EU and national law. After Chen
and other similar cases, Irish voters approved in 2004 by referendum an amendment to the 
Irish Constitution that made it possible for the government to deny citizenship to children 
born in Ireland without at least one Irish parent. See Dail Debates, Vol 583, No 6 (21 April 
2004). 
130  See, eg, Case 370/90 The Queen v Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Surinder Singh
[1992] ECR I-4265; Case 291/05 Minister voor Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie v R. N. G. 
Eind [2007] ECR I-10719; Case 127/08 Blaise Baheten Metock and Others v Minister for 
Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2008] ECR I-6241. Furthermore, Directive 2003/109/EC 
addresses the status of long-term resident third-country nationals in the European Union 
and provides that ‘the legal status of a third-country national should be approximated to 
that of Member States’ nationals and that a person who has resided legally in a Member 
State for a period of time to be determined and who holds a long-term residence permit 
should be granted in that Member State a set of uniform rights which are as near as possi-
ble to those enjoyed by citizens of the European Union’. Council Directive (EC) 2003/109 of 
25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term resi-
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treatment in relation to social assistance.131 Nevertheless, just as EU  
organs have recalibrated the scope of European citizenship rights,132 
the Member States have reserved for themselves an almost indisputable
prerogative as gatekeepers for these rights.133 This prerogative has been 
coupled with a constriction of national citizenship policies, both in direct 
contravention or failed implementation of EU regulations, as well as in
tendencies of exclusion and discrimination in areas still under the sole
competence of national governments.134 
The gap between the national and non-national, however, emerges 
most sharply in the case of the ‘would-be’ European, the refugee or asy-
lum seeker, against whom the European Union has erected dehumanis-
ing and often violent edifices of exclusion. Immigration and asylum pro-
cedures of the EU over the past two decades have been steadily criticised
as in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights and other
dents [2004] OJ L16. With the acquisition of long-term residency, therefore, TCNs should 
secure the right of equal treatment in employment, education, access to social security and 
to tax benefits, as well as protection against expulsion. 
131  See Case 85/96 María Martínez Sala v Freistaat Bayern [1998] ECR I-2691. But see 
Case 158/07 Jacqueline Förster v Hoofddirectie van de Informatie Beheer Groep [2008] ECR 
I-8507. 
132  More recently, on 13 December 2011, the European Parliament and Commission adopt-
ed the Directive on a single application procedure for a single permit for third-country 
nationals to reside and work in the territory of a Member State and on a common set of 
rights for third-country workers residing in a Member State. Directive (EU) 2011/98 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on a single application pro-
cedure for a single permit for third-country nationals to reside and work in the territory of a 
Member State and on a common set of rights for third-country workers residing in a Mem-
ber State [2011] OJ L343/54. The Single Permit Directive, while positive, presents merely a 
‘small step forward in EU legal and labour migration’ with limited scope (no less than twelve 
categories of people are excluded) and unambitious levels of harmonisation with signifi cant 
margins for derogation and manoeuvre at the national level. European Policy Centre, ‘EU 
Single Permit Directive: A Small Step Forward in EU Migration Policy,’ Policy Brief, 24 Janu-
ary 2012 <http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/pub_1398_eu_single_permit_directive. 
pdf> accessed 10 June 2012. 
133 See Case 135/08 Janko Rottman v Freistaat Bayern [2010] ECR I-1449. 
134  For example, EU Member States have generally failed to transpose effectively the Citi-
zens’ Rights Directive, requiring supplementary supporting materials and producing sub-
stantial processing delays. See, eg, Sergio Carrera & Anais Faure Atger, ‘Implementation of 
Directive 2004/38 in the Context of EU Enlargement: A Proliferation of Different Forms of 
Citizenship?’ (2009) Centre for European Policy Studies Special Report; A. Hunter, ‘Family 
Members: An Analysis of the Implementation of the Citizens’ Directive in UK law’ (2007) 
Journal of Immigration, Asylum & Nationality Law. The European Commission itself la-
mented in a December 2008 implementation report: ‘The overall transposition of Directive 
2004/38/EC is rather disappointing. Not one Member State has transposed the Directive 
effectively and correctly in its entirety. Not one Article of the Directive has been transposed 
effectively and correctly by all Member States’. Report from the Commission to the Euro-
pean Parliament and the Council of 10 December 2008 on the application of Directive (EC) 
2004/38 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside 
freely within the territory of the Member States [2008] COM 840. 
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UN Conventions on civil and human rights.135 The Schengen Convention
and the Dublin II Regulation together present European law’s focus not 
on the free movement of individuals but rather on its control and sur-
veillance.136 The determination of rights to asylum and the processing of
migrants remain astride the grey area where lawful conduct ends and 
criminality begins and where insufficiencies of legal process invite the 
discretion of police power. Indeed, the Meijers Commission and many 
academics have criticised the Schengen Convention for its lack of ac-
countability to either parliamentary or judicial organs,137 though - with
the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty - these concerns have been (at 
least in principle, if not in practice) to an extent allayed.138 
The Dublin II Regulation is intended to determine the EU Member
State responsible for examining a claim to asylum under the Geneva 
Convention and the EU Qualifi cation Directive.139 The European Council 
on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) and human rights groups have condemned Dublin
II for failing to protect refugees effectively: procedures under Dublin reg-
ularly impede the rights to a fair examination of the asylum claim and 
to sufficient protection where that claim has been recognised, regularly 
cause significant delays in the processing of claims, and have particu-
larly harsh effects on families and asylum seekers with special needs.140 
135 See Ian Ward, ‘Identifying the European Other’ (2002) 14 International Journal of Refu-
gee Law 219, 229-30. 
136 Specifically, the Schengen Information System maintains surveillance of immigrants, 
migrants, and asylum seekers. 
137 See H Meijers (ed), Schengen: Internalisation of Central Chapters of the Law on Aliens, 
Refugees, Privacy, Security and the Police (Stichting NCJM 1992). See also Elspeth Guild, 
‘Between Persecution and Protection: Refugees and the New European Asylum Policy’ (2000) 
3 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 169, 197; V Guiraudon, ‘European Inte-
gration and Migration Policy: Vertical Policy-making as Venue Shopping’ (2000) 38 Journal 
of Common Market Studies 251, 263-4. 
138  With the Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force on 1 December 2009, the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union became binding law on all European Union 
agencies. Immigration authorities’ ability to act, therefore, is not unlimited, but rather is 
bound by the Charter. Article 18 guarantees ‘the right to asylum’ and Article 4 of the Char-
ter states, ‘[N]o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman and degrading treatment 
or punishment’. Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
establishing the European Community <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ: 
C:2007:306:SOM:EN:HTML> accessed 10 June 2012; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, 2000/C 364/01, 18 December 2000, art 6, para 1 <http://www.europarl. 
europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf> accessed 10 June 2012. 
139  Council Regulation (EC) 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and 
mechanism for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum ap-
plication lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national [2003] OJ L 50/1 
[hereinafter Dublin II Regulation]. 
140  See, eg, European Council on Refugees and Exiles, Comments on the European Com-
mission Proposal to Recast the Dublin Regulation, April 2009; UN High Commissioner for 
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Moreover, by permitting the uneven distribution of asylum claims among
European Member States, Dublin II shifts significant burdens onto the
external border areas of the European Union, specifically onto states
that are often unable to provide asylum seekers with the necessary pro-
tections and are already strained under a backlog of asylum applications 
and appeals.141 This problem, as we shall see, is particularly acute in
countries like Spain, Italy, and Greece. 
In general, the Dublin II system reveals a decidedly restrictive and 
defensive posture against seekers of asylum.142 Indeed, both Schengen 
and Dublin II indicate a concession that, despite overarching interna-
tional human rights concerns and concerted moves toward harmonisa-
tion, immigration and asylum policies remain in the functional control of
nation-states. That is, far from being viewed through the lens of anything
approaching democratic cosmopolitics, these policies are still considered
fi rst and foremost matters of national ‘security’ and criminality. This, of
course, has far reaching consequences for the approach of state offi cials 
and police. As Ian Ward argues, rather than working to support asylum
procedures and facilities with sufficient resources, the policy is instead 
intended to control and to negate the flows of migration.143 It should be
noted, too, that in addition to restricting movement by applying the ‘one
application only’ rule, the European Union has formally excluded the 
category of ‘economic refugees’ from asylum claims altogether and thus
failed to recognise (however minimally) the core of global economic in-
justice today.144 
Yet, more than failing to establish a comprehensive regime to ac-
cept and to integrate foreigners, including those wishing to work in the
EU (admittedly, an ambitious though not impossible task), the Euro-
pean system has relaxed internal border controls and replaced them
Refugees, UNHCR Comments on the European Commission’s Proposal for a Recast of the 
Dublin and Eurodac Regulations, 18 March 2009 <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/ 
49c0ca922.html> accessed 10 June 2012; Human Rights Watch, Left to Survive: Systematic 
Failure to Protect Unaccompanied Migrant Children in Greece, 11 December 2008. 
141 See Human Rights Council, Mission to Greece Report Submitted by the Special Rap-
porteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
Manfred Nowak, 4 March 2011, A/HRW/16/52/Add.4. 
142  In 1992, for example, the European Ministers responsible for immigration issues draft-
ed a recommendation to states concerning expulsion practices and, in baffling disregard for 
civil liberties provisions and in violation of the European Convention, they noted that Mem-
ber States should enjoy the ‘power in appropriate circumstances to restrict the personal 
liberty of people liable to expulsion’. Community Ministers for Immigration, Recommenda-
tion Regarding Practices Followed by Member States on Expulsion, SN 4678/92 WG11266, 
1 December 1992. 
143 See Ward (n 135) 232; see also Jef Huysmans, ‘The European Union and the Securitiza-
tion of Migration’ (2000) 38 Journal of Common Market Studies 751, 756-8. 
144 See Ward (n 135) 232. 
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with a system of detention camps on the Union’s reinforced external bor-
ders. The prominent harsh treatment and extra-judicial deportation of
Albanians from Italy in 1992 is a pattern that today continues across
the Mediterranean.145 Human Rights Watch and Amnesty Internation-
al have published several reports documenting the detention practices 
and human rights violations at facilities in Greece, the Netherlands, and 
Spain.146 Detained irregular immigrants and refugees often must endure 
hunger, thirst, severe overcrowding, and poor ventilation. Human Rights
Watch reporters described a detention camp in Spain: 
At times, more than 500 migrants have been kept in a space that the 
Spanish Red Cross has determined to be designed to accommodate 
fifty people. Detainees are cut of from the outside world. There are 
no telephones. Visits are not permitted. Detainees can never leave 
the premises; they cannot exercise, and have no exposure to fresh 
air or sunlight. The state of medical care and sanitary conditions 
in the facilities also raised serious concern, particularly when the 
volunteer doctors at the facilities suspended their services in protest 
over the conditions.147 
The effects of detention are not just physical but also psychologi-
cal. A detainee, kept for six months in the Netherlands on boats with
little ventilation or access to daylight, described psychological trauma: 
‘Though they may not beat you, the conditions force you into submission; 
they kill you psychologically’.148 
Furthermore, the discharge of asylum processing by police consti-
tutes in many instances a violation of international human rights law.149 
145 See Bruno Nascimbene, ‘The Albanians in Italy: The Right of Asylum Under Attack?’ 
(1992) 3 International Journal of Refugee Law 714, 719-20. Giorgio Agamben draws a par-
ticularly strong analogy between these detentions of asylum seekers, specifically the Alba-
nians in Italy, and the emergency regime of the camp: ‘The stadium in Bari into which the 
Italian police in 1991 provisionally herded all illegal Albanian immigrants before sending 
them back to their country, the winter cycle-racing track in which the Vichy authorities 
gathered the Jews before consigning them to the Germans, the Konzentrationslager für Aus-
länder in Cottbus-Sielow in which the Weimar government gathered Jewish refugees from 
the East, or the zones d’attentes in French international airports in which foreigners asking 
for refugee status are detained will then equally be camps. Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: 
Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Daniel Heller-Roazen tr, Stanford UP 1998) 174. 
146  Human Rights Watch, Statement: The Human Rights Dimension of EU Immigration Policy: 
Lessons from Member States (2002); Human Rights Watch, Stuck in a Revolving Door: Iraqis 
and Other Asylum Seekers and Migrants at the Greece/Turkey Entrance to the European Un-
ion (2008); Amnesty International, The Netherlands: The Detention of Irregular Immigrants 
and Asylum Seekers (2008). 
147  Human Rights Watch, Statement (n 146). 
148  Amnesty International (n 146). 
149  Article 31(1) of the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees states: 
‘The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or 
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In Greece, for example, putting the preliminary asylum process in the 
hands of police offi cers without sufficient training to conduct interviews
severely undermines the presumption of a legal framework in which asy-
lum seekers are to be given legal information about their rights and asy-
lum procedures.150 Asylum seekers are often simply given orders to leave,
written in the host country language. The detainee is rarely offered an
interpreter or given a translation, even upon being asked to sign docu-
ments authorising his or her deportation.151 While some of these return-
transfers between countries occur officially, there are many accounts of
unofficial and illegal ‘drops’ or ‘dumps’ of immigrants across the border 
by police. Human Rights Watch reported that 12,000 third-country na-
tionals were unlawfully deposited by Greek officials beyond the borders
with Turkey between 2002 and 2007.152 
Over the past several years, asylum seekers and migrants have
fi led legal challenges in European courts concerning unlawful transfers
to other Member States under the Dublin II Regulation153 and related
forcible returns threatening exposure to ill-treatment. In January 2011, 
the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Belgium and Greece 
violated Articles 3 and 13 of the European Convention due to Belgium’s 
expulsion of asylum seekers to Greece, where they would be exposed 
to the deficiencies of the Greek asylum procedures and to detention un-
der inhuman and degrading living conditions.154 Similarly, in December
presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was 
threatened in the sense of Article 1, enter or are present in their territory without authori-
zation, provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good 
cause for their illegal entry or presence’. 
150  Human Rights Watch, Stuck in a Revolving Door (n 146). 
151 See Human Rights Watch, Statement (n 146); Human Rights Watch, Stuck in a Revolving 
Door (n 146); Amnesty International (n 146). ‘Rather than initiate a deportation procedure 
and enforce the removal of an undocumented migrant, the Greek authorities’ usual practice 
is to detain the migrants and upon release from detention hand them a paper which tells 
them to leave the country within 30 days. This 30-day deadline for departure, commonly 
known as the “white paper”, is written only in Greek’. Human Rights Watch, Stuck in a 
Revolving Door (n 146). 
152 ibid. 
153  The Dublin II Regulation and its criteria are designed to avoid ‘asylum shopping’ and to 
ensure that only one Member State processes each asylum applicant’s claim. When a Mem-
ber State is deemed responsible under Dublin II to examine a particular asylum application 
but that individual is currently in a second EU Member State, a transfer between the two 
states must be arranged. Detention is often used to enforce such transfers. 
154 MSS v Belgium & Greece App no 30696/09 (ECHR 21 January 2011). The Court consid-
ered the conditions endured by the applicant in the detention facilities to be unacceptable. 
It furthermore considered that, ‘taken together, the feeling of arbitrariness and the feeling 
of inferiority and anxiety often associated with it, as well as the profound effect such condi-
tions of detention indubitably have on a person’s dignity, constitute degrading treatment 
contrary to Article 3 of the Convention’. ibid. The Court also recognised that the applicant’s 
distress was doubtless intensified by the ‘vulnerability inherent in his situation as an asy-
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2011, the European Court of Justice ruled that EU Member States have
an obligation under Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights not 
to transfer asylum seekers where they would risk being subjected to in-
human or degrading treatment and that the transferring state has a re-
sponsibility to establish whether the receiving state would be considered
a responsible receiving party under the Dublin II criteria.155 Additionally,
in February 2012, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Italy
violated Articles 3 and 13 of the European Convention in its interception
in international waters and forcible return to Libya of 200 Eritrean and
Somali migrants.156 
Nevertheless, rights violations by both national and EU-level agents
implementing European asylum and immigration policies persist. Eu-
ropean Union border officials and guards from almost all EU Member 
States continue their involvement in the systematic mistreatment of mi-
grants as part of the operations of Frontex, the European border agency
tasked with the management of operational coordination at external bor-
ders. Human Rights Watch (HRW) recently published a report on Frontex 
activities in the Evros region on the border of Greece and Turkey between 
November 2010 and March 2011.157 In that report, HRW documented
how Frontex officers facilitated the transfer of migrants to Greek deten-
tion centres, in which individuals were exposed to precisely the inhu-
man and degrading conditions condemned by the European Court of
Human Rights. In addition to the deplorable detention conditions, HRW 
pointed to a serious protection gap, ‘including the risk that genuine refu-
gees might not be identified and would be subjected to refoulement’.158 
The report concluded that Frontex activities in Greece failed to meet the 
human rights standards of the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights.159 
Further, in July 2012, Amnesty International again sharply criticised
Italian authorities for continuing to violate the rights of refugees through 
the clandestine revival of its migration control agreement with Libya (a
mere iteration of the very agreement condemned by the European Court 
of Human Rights in February), ‘despite firm evidence that migrants, ref-
ugees and asylum-seekers are still subject to serious abuse’ on Libyan
lum seeker’. ibid. 
155  Joined Cases 411/10 NS v Secretary of State for the Home Department and 493/10 ME 
and Others v Refugee Applications Commissioner, Minister for Justice, Equality and Law 
Reform (ECJ 21 December 2011). 
156 Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy App no 27765/09 (ECHR 23 February 2012). 
157  Human Rights Watch, The EU’s Dirty Hands: Frontex Involvement in Ill-Treatment of 
Migrant Detainees in Greece (September 2011). 
158  ibid 3. 
159  ibid 3, 46-51. 
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territory, including ‘arbitrary arrest, indefinite detention, beatings which 
can amount to torture and exploitation by armed militias’.160 
There are two points to be made here. First, there is of course the 
problem of implementing legal norms as articulated by the European
Court of Human Rights and the Charter. HRW thus welcomed cautiously
the deployment of European Asylum Support Office (EASO) personnel to 
Greece to assist officials in improving the asylum process conditions, as
well as praised moves to establish Fundamental Rights Offi cers (FROs)
within Frontex to aid in detainee rights protection.161 In a sense, this  
seems to be precisely what Goodin has in mind, the expansion of bu-
reaucratic agencies to cover the gaps emerging within protection sys-
tems. And yet the worry is that such gaps can never be covered fully, that
such gaps are instead constitutive of the system itself. As the HRW re-
port itself notes: ‘Just as Frontex has been designed not to make admin-
istrative decisions, EASO too is not authorized to make determinations 
on asylum request [nor does it have] a specific mandate to intervene di-
rectly on detention conditions’.162 The refugee status determination (RSD)
procedure remains in the last instance the ascribed prerogative of EU 
Member States. A prospective common European asylum policy - while 
cautiously applauded as a necessary step to improve rights protection
in the course of processing asylum claims - will likely remain insuffi -
cient in this regard if the entry decision remains within the competence 
of the nation-state, as such. Despite numerous negative judgments by 
European courts and continuing denunciations by international rights
groups, the constraint of legality on practical decision-making remains 
confused, weak, and largely ineffectual in response to large migration 
fl ows, flows which appear only to grow with time. 
160  Amnesty International, ‘Press Release: EU can’t outsource migration control to Libya’ 
(5 July 2012) <http://www.amnesty.eu/en/press-releases/all/0581-0581/> accessed 20 
September 2012. It must be noted that, at the time of the writing of this article, the Euro-
pean Parliament’s civil liberties committee passed a promising reform package strengthen-
ing protections for asylum seekers under the Dublin II Regulation. See Nikolaj Nielsen, 
‘EU lawmakers reinforce asylum seekers’ rights’ EUObserver (19 September 2012) <http:// 
euobserver.com/justice/117604> accessed 20 September 2012. Should it be passed by 
the plenary at the end of this year, the reform addresses—at least at the formal level of 
EU law—many of the deficiencies long noted by human rights organisations and criticised 
by the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice. ibid. As I 
elaborate below, however, there are reasons to remain guarded in our optimism concerning 
the practical efficacy of such a measure. While it of course represents a welcome shift, the 
reform fails to change in a fundamental sense the underlying structural weakness of EU 
policy. If this latest tentative step toward a more humane common asylum system is to be 
commended, it remains critical to emphasise the gaps in implementation and protection 
that remain at both the practical and conceptual levels. 
161  Human Rights Watch, The EU’s Dirty Hands (n 157) 16-8. 
162  ibid 17-8. See Regulation (EU) 439/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 19 May 2010 establishing a European Asylum Support Office [2010] OJ L132. 
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Related to but distinct from the problem of implementation, however,
is a second, deeper interplay. When we speak of the rights of migrants, 
we clearly are not only at the borders of the state but also at the limits of
the law, at which the sovereign power is able to exercise violence over hu-
man beings. As Itamar Mann (incidentally, author of the Human Rights
Watch Frontex report) insightfully argues, the suffering of the refugee 
at the margins of Europe is a result of the disaggregation of sovereignty 
itself, through which the responsibility of state actors - European and 
national - is fragmented.163 Indeed, coupling underdetermined oversight 
and facilitation by European agencies with final enforcement by national
constabularies functions precisely to obscure, rather than to clarify, ad-
ministrative accountability. Here, the gaps are recognised not simply to 
accompany the shift from national to transnational law but rather to be
symptomatic of it. That is, the failure here is not exogenous to disaggre-
gation processes but rather written directly into their internal logic. 
Thus, while disaggregation may provide the flexibility to extend legal
recognition to new and ‘post-national’ contexts, it simultaneously creates
new sites of vulnerability in which sovereignty - in the sense of the ex-
tra-legal ‘decision’ - operates without legality, and in which individuals 
are exposed to violence without the protection of law. In other words,
disaggregation of sovereignty invites the disaggregation (and thus the 
dilution) of responsibility. Once the links of responsibility have been cut,
the Union and its Member States become free to rearrange and juxta-
pose violence and law selectively, if not altogether arbitrarily. Moreover, 
this juxtaposition is no longer visible as an act of politics or of political
intervention (and therefore contestable as such) but is instead framed as
a matter of administration, of bureaucratic implementation only vaguely
and elusively correlated to the field of public contestation. While this 
may be most acute for the treatment of refugees, is this not also the 
conceptual analogue of EU citizenship’s dark obverse, in which politi-
cal, civil, and social rights no longer accrue within a self-legislating and 
empowered citizen but rather are scattered across time and space, in
which certain classes of individuals are systematically denied certain 
categories of rights?  
Asylum seekers and refugees at the edge of Europe thus encounter
the ‘border’ in its most concrete and potent form: the detention zones,
transfer vessels and transit camps in which the conceptual vision offered 
by Agamben’s ‘zone of exception’ is realised. Full, coherent rights are 
suspended as individuals are thrust into places and times of dissolution. 
163  Personal conversations with the author; see also Itamar Mann, ‘The Legal Structure of 
Europe’s Human Rights Crisis: A Preliminary Outline,’ informal working paper, Yale Law 
School, fall 2011. 
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Here, law no longer assumes the social-integrative function ascribed to 
it by the sublime heights of Habermasian discourse theory. Instead, law 
is unmasked, in instances of greatest tragedy, as a technicality through 
which the sovereign state may act as it wishes. Individuals may be killed, 
may die, but may not be sacrifi ced.164 The refugee, at the boundary of
banishment and abandonment, is subject to the processes of selection 
and filtration that the sovereign imposes. The social meaning of his 
death - a marker of certain communal bonds - simply fails to hold; the 
social contract is never written. 
These exclusions within and at the borders of Europe, if they are 
allowed to persist, present significant dangers for the success of a supra-
national, cosmopolitan European project. In these cases, the chauvin-
ism and alienation of nationalism is merely refashioned and repackaged, 
simply transferred from the intra-Union space to an extra-Union one,
where those excluded are now either non-EU citizens or those formally
within the EU who nevertheless lack full citizenship, who remain pre-
cisely a ‘part with no part’. Moreover, the extension of political and social
rights itself is orthogonal to the problem of the refugee or the irregular
immigrant; their problem will remain unresolved as long as the logic of
inclusion/exclusion remains unchallenged. The figure of the refugee will
be recreated again and again. To invoke this figure is to think the liberal 
state against itself, to bear witness to its internal, constitutive failures. 
European unification thus cannot be achieved without the kinds of dem-
ocratic surpluses brought into being in the course of confronting and 
working through these paradoxes of exclusion. The development of this 
new European philosophy of immigration will, in large part, determine 
the future course of the Union and whether it will be worthy of its own 
ideals of democratic cosmopolitanism. 
But what, concretely, can be the template for such an alternative?
Where are the beginnings, the roots, of the new democratic cosmopolitics 
to be found? In the EU context, one painful realisation is that economic
integration on its own is particularly ill-suited for the task of crossing
boundaries in this particular way, by asserting equality on a previous-
ly closed regime. Economic integration embraces a short-circuited ab-
straction that feeds from the logics of equivalence of global capitalism. 
Here, the Other is elided as Other, and difference is all but erased in its 
distinctly political forms. The Other is included only insofar as he is a 
productive-consumptive force and on terms not of his choosing or com-
mand. On the other hand, a cross-border, supranational integration - in
effect a certain Aufhebung of borders themselves - inheres in the asser-
tion of equality by particular political agents heterogeneous to the exist-
164  See Agamben, Homo Sacer (n 145). 
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ing order. In the supranational context, only these are political agents
proper; only these can confront the political question in its original, that
is to say, contingent, form. The search for such political agents is thus 
in essence also a reiteration of the search for a European founding mo-
ment. Yet, and this is critical, the founding moment is precisely not the
assertion of a new supranational whole. It is instead the confrontation 
of political division, of the boundaries that divide, in the name of those
excluded and in search for a political future that presents itself only as
indeterminacy, as negativity. It is, fi rst and foremost, a refusal.
If the current phenomenon of the Other’s internal exclusion is in-
deed symptomatic of our legalistic programme of inclusion, and if cos-
mopolitanism indeed lacks a participatory-political solidarity, then the 
invocation of the refugee as a heterogeneous element with political agen-
cy can be the beginning of a new European identity. The contemporary
struggles of refugees and immigrants might become the ‘worksites’165 
within which concrete political affects can unite, connect and inspire 
other objects of marginalisation and depoliticisiation. It is for this reason
that I gestured above at the idea that Greece - today bearing the confl u-
ence of European technocratic governance, EU enlargement, and migra-
tory pressures - might offer Europe its own ‘Philadelphia’: the concrete, 
particular moment in which Europe confronts its political divisions in
the name of cosmopolitics. 
6. Droit de cité: toward a Europe of democratic cosmopolitanism 
If the peripheral encounter prompts emulation and a broader re-
appraisal of identity, what will be the contemporary spaces for such a 
European cosmopolitics, in which a new European political subjectiv-
ity can develop? In this sense I welcome the proposal that a proper and 
promising response to Europe’s increasingly histrionic anti-immigrant
sentiment should be the assertion of a new European droit de cité: the 
extension of a full right of immigration, of entry and residency, of hos-
pitality and citizenship to those who are here merely by virtue of the fact
that they are here.166 As Honig writes: 
We can enact droits de cité - by taking people in, harboring them, 
offering them shelter, finding sympathetic agents of discretionary 
power who are willing to look the other way - while also risking 
the re-authorization of law’s authoritative institutions by working 
through them to win papers or amnesty.167 
165  See generally Balibar, We, the People of Europe? (n 37) 172-79. 
166 See Honig, ‘Another Cosmopolitanism?’ (n 110) 118. 
167 ibid. 
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The droit de cité is therefore the practice of symbolic disruption. It
is enacted in the channels between the formalism of law and the contin-
gency of its shadow; it anticipates legal change by bringing its practical 
ethics into being. Moreover, it revives the European city - as opposed to 
the nation or region - as the site of a new European democratic cosmo-
politanism.168 The city, seen as a staging area for a new European collec-
tive action, for social contestation, reminds Europe of its own traditions 
of radical democracy. The contemporary European city bridges the local 
and the global, the particular and the universal, in ways that escape
dominant logics of exclusion. 
In this respect, the right of citizenship can be reformulated as a 
right to the city, the right to public space as such. Droit de cité is the 
most literal articulation of civic solidarity, of carving out a space of inter-
subjective engagement distinct from either market-driven or state-driven
logics. Here, droit de cité entails the symbolic reshuffl ing of legitimacy
and politics. Droit de cité is not a denial of territoriality but rather its re-
definition, its reformulation in the name of those excluded. In extending 
the right of citizenship to one another, the residents of Europe (nationals 
and non-nationals alike) would recognise their own liminal positions as
political subjects, the fact of life that they are always already in contin-
gent arrangements of exodus and refuge, and that redemption from this 
alienation comes only in reaffirming and recreating new forms of ‘being-
in-common’. As Agamben himself writes: 
The European space would thus represent an unbridgeable gap be-
tween birth and nation, in which the old concept of people (which, 
as is well known, is always a minority) could again find a political 
sense by decisively opposing the concept of nation (which until now 
has unduly usurped it).169 
Here, cries such as ‘We are all refugees now!’ or even the sincere but 
hollow testaments of ‘We are all Sarajevans now!’ from contemporary
Europe’s painful memory, even these cries can regain meaning. Droit de 
cité entails that citizens recognise their inner contingency, their inner 
indeterminacy, and imagine once again that a new politics is possible. 
Droit de cité must be carefully distinguished from the mere disag-
gregation of sovereignty. The European city, in asserting the right to 
citizenship, is instead precisely the site where sovereignty, in all of its 
new autonomies and new collectivities, reconstitutes itself once national
sovereignty has been dispersed. The city offers the institutional diversity 
168  Derrida, too, looks to the city as a possible site for the renegotiation of a new cosmopoli-
tanism. See Jacques Derrida, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness (Routledge 2001). 
169  Agamben, ‘We Refugees’ (n 111). 
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and confluence of local and global pressures from which new forms of
collective identity might emerge.170 The key move here lies in translat-
ing the contestation of particular political identities into questions of
civic place, in which the spatial dimension offers a motif for common
political resistance against homogeneity in the name of the citizen, for 
the polis always astride the particular and the universal. In fact, the city
- because it must ultimately bear the choice and consequences of entry,
of asylum, of membership, or of the provision of social services directly
- becomes the locus of the negotiation of the ‘part with no part’. While 
there are again no guarantees here, the structural opportunity to see the
city as a city of refuge is clear. As Manuel Castells eloquently writes: 
Thus the historical specificity of European cities may be a fundamen-
tal asset in creating the conditions for managing the contradictions 
between the global and the local in the new context of the informa-
tional society. Because European cities have strong civil societies, 
rooted in an old history and a rich, diversified culture, they could 
stimulate citizen participation as a fundamental antidote against 
tribalism and alienation. And because the tradition of European cit-
ies as city states leading the place to the modern age in much of Eu-
rope is engraved in the collective memory of their people, the revival 
of the city state could be the necessary complement to the expansion 
of a global economic and the creation of a European state.171 
Thus, as Europe searches for new expressions of political legitimacy
beyond the present boundaries of the nation-state, the city offers an
affirmative counter-model for situating the overlapping and diverse cul-
tures constitutive of contemporary cosmopolitan identity. The city en-
ables political mobilisation beyond the traditional actors in mass repre-
sentative democracy.
In this respect, droit de cité is not a right to be granted or appor-
tioned or adjudicated from above. Instead, it can only exist, can only be
meaningful as a context achieved from below. The inversion is clear. The 
incursions made against the closed body politic by various immigrant 
groups or by the populations increasingly pushed to the peripheries of
impoverished cities, far from disrupting the polity, these incursions of-
fer precisely the chance (perhaps the first and only in today’s globalised
world facing the civic appeals of cosmopolitanism) to rebuild active citi-
170  See generally Michael Keating & Monika De Frantz, ‘Culture-led Strategies for Urban 
Regeneration: A Comparative Perspective on Bilbao’ (2004) 16(3) International Journal of 
Iberian Studies 187; Patrick Le Galés, European Cities: Social Conflicts and Governance 261 
(OUP 2002). 
171  Manuel Castells, ‘European Cities, the Informational Society, and the Global Economy’ 
(1994) 204(3-4) New Left Rev 18, 32. 
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zenship and, with it, a polity in the truest sense of the word, beyond
inclusion and exclusion. 
Here, the extension of droit de cité anticipates juridical grants of citi-
zenship and political rights. Droit de cité runs before, skips ahead of, the 
constitutionalisation of rights and their assertion before legal authorities 
or tribunals. It is in this sense a true moment of founding, when ‘time
runs widdershins and the present precedes itself’,172 when the people’s
contingency is made visible and true political freedom (in the Arend-
tian sense of beginning something anew) is made possible. As Balibar 
explains, ‘Its indispensable regulations can only result from negotiation
and from the recognition of those concerned as legitimate interlocutors 
who have the right to explain their situation, formulate demands and 
propose solutions’.173  In its anticipation, in its skipping ahead, droit de 
cité takes on a form similar to the Jacques Derrida’s ‘democracy-to-come’,
la démocratie à vénir.
For Derrida, the connection between ethics and politics must sig-
nal and affirm one’s infinite responsibility to the Other inscribed always 
provisionally within the fi nite expressions of self and polity.174 Moreover,
the task of institutionalising such a relationship is precisely what I take
to be the substance of the European project; that is, Europe itself can 
appropriate the urgency of Derrida’s ‘The New International’, ’another 
international law, another politics of frontiers, another humanitarian
politics’,175 a ‘democracy-to-come’.  Elsewhere, Simon Critchley has elab-
orated the difficulties of the latter term - la démocratie à vénir - and its 
inherent contradictions,176 but the vision is formidable and relevant. 
Democracy-to-come in a sense takes place in-between: a glimpsed
injunction, an eruption into the here-and-now that, though incalcula-
ble, speaks to the calculation of normal politics. It has a dual structure 
of something yet to occur in the future, while simultaneously ‘blasting 
through the continuum of the present’.177 It is the experience, in the 
end, of the infinite task, for which we will always be held to account, yet 
the fulfilment of which will always be deferred, as we can fulfi l only a 
limited responsibility ourselves. The movement between the infi nite and
the fi nite does resemble a form of process, though very much unlike the 
172  Fitzpatrick (n 68) 74. 
173 Balibar, We, the People of Europe? (n 37) 48. 
174 Jacques Derrida, Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas (Michael Naas tr, Stanford UP 1999) 201. 
175  ibid 176. 
176  See, eg, Simon Critchley, ‘The Other’s Decision in Me,’ Ethics-Politics-Subjectivity: Es-
says on Derrida, Levinas and Contemporary French Thought 254 (Verso 1999). 
177  Simon Critchley, ‘Remarks on Derrida and Habermas’ (2000) 7(4) Constellations 455, 
464. 
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formal proceduralism of discursive law itself. This movement takes place
through a temporal and spatial oscillation, through the recognition of
identity as fluid and, in a deep sense, shared - with those who have come
before us and with those who will follow. 
Droit de cité brings la démocratie à vénir into concrete being; it cre-
ates the space for its arrival. If it is to exist at all, European cosmo-
politanism requires concrete intervention into identity and difference.  
It cannot be proclaimed through abstract norms of law and economy.
In a sense, cosmopolitanism exists only in the liminal case and must
be re-established again and again. Droit de cité is therefore an effort to
institutionalise, with all of its risks and uncertainties, a form of civil 
disobedience, through which the settled constitution can be reassessed, 
amended, reformulated - specifically by those who are at the margins,
in the liminal spaces, those on whom that settled system depends to ex-
ist in the fi rst place.178 In short, droit de cité calls for the inclusion of the 
‘part with no part’, to democratise the borders of inclusion. In Balibar’s 
terms, the ‘minimal’ remainder of the human right to have rights be-
comes the ‘maximum’ that makes possible the total continuum of rights
expected in a democratic community.179 
It is thereby that - on the path of EU enlargement and integration 
- we can say with Derrida that we are all Europeans, yet we are also
not yet Europeans, and can never wholly be. Indeed, we are European
precisely insofar as we see that we are not Europeans fully. The identity
of Europe is intertwined with its non-identity, with its non-European
Other, and with an openness to an indefinite and unsettled future. 
178  Balibar writes movingly of the sans-papiers movement in France, of their courage in ‘re-
activating’ a new civic solidarity in the course of challenging the Pasqua and Debré laws of 
the 1990s. See Balibar, We, the People of Europe? (n 37) 48-9. The heirs of such movements 
are in some sense the Occupy, 15-M and S21 protests of contemporary Europe. 
179  ibid 119. 
